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Abstract   
This thesis investigates the generation of resource rent in the Norwegian aquaculture industry 
during 2010-2017. Whereas past empirical research on resource rent assumes that the license 
holder captures the entire rent, this thesis analyzes rent by also allowing for rent generation in 
other parts of the value chain. I develop an appropriate model based on a standard definition of 
economic profit from the economic literature. Using firm-specific accounting data on more than 
seven hundred companies from 2010 to 2017, I find that the industry generates substantial 
resource rent. Specifically, the results indicate a total resource rent of NOK 74.9 billion over 
the period, where 70.5 accrues to the license holders, and the remaining 4.4 billion accrues to 
other parts of the value chain (floating prices). License holders benefit greatly from exclusive 
access to high-quality natural resources, whereas the remaining parts of the value chain profits 
from a strong demand for goods and services, mostly driven by biological challenges in the 
farming operations.  
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1. Introduction 
Norway has a proud tradition of leveraging the commercial potential of its natural resources to 
benefit the public. As a result, it consistently ranks among the world’s richest and best places 
to live (Lange et al., 2018). Historically, the most important resource industries have been 
forestry, fisheries, and hydropower. In the late sixties, Phillips Petroleum (now ConocoPhillips) 
drilled the first successful oil well on Norwegian soil, and petroleum has been the most 
important resource ever since. However, at the same time, Norway has also built a considerable 
aquaculture industry. In fact, Norway is the second largest aquaculture exporter in the world 
measured by value (FAO, 2018). The most common species are Atlantic salmon and rainbow 
trout.  
Aquaculture production relies on natural resources, e.g., clean water and designated areas. In 
addition, it depends on the ecosystem’s ability to handle increased biomass with the 
implications that follow, e.g., waste products, procreation of parasites, diseases, etc. Economists 
often call these implications “externalities”. All the resources, including the ecosystem, is 
common property and belong to the public. The problem with most common property resources 
is that resource users (farmers) do not account for the externalities. Thus, they have an incentive 
to use more of the resource than what is socially optimal, known in the economics literature as 
“tragedy of the commons”. The tragedy is simply the long-term consequences of short-term 
overexploitation. In order to curb externalities, authorities often impose regulations. The 
Norwegian government has introduced many precautionary restrictions, such as maximum 
allowed lice levels, systematic fallowing, maximum stock density in pens, licensing, etc. 
Licenses are a prerequisite for any aquaculture activity in Norway and regulate the maximum 
allowed standing biomass. The number of traditional permits has remained practically fixed 
since 2013 (DoF, 2019b), thus defining a quantity-sealing on both company and national levels. 
Legally enforced supply restrictions alter the free competition characteristics of the market and 
push prices up. As a consequence, established industry players can freely operate with abnormal 
margins without the threat of new entrants. The extraordinary profits that arise from the 
privileged access to exploit scarce natural resources carry the name “resource rent” in economic 
literature.  Formally, it represents the economic profit from exploiting natural resources, i.e., it 
measures the net benefit from the resource by subtracting all accrued production costs, 
including the opportunity cost of capital, from the accrued revenue. By this definition, one can 
interpret the rent as the value of the resource. The magnitude of the rent is irrespective of the 
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interpretation. In recent years, there has been a significant price increase of both salmon and 
rainbow trout driven by aggravated biological conditions in Chile. 1 For this reason, the resource 
rent has increased drastically and gained public attention. The essence of the ongoing debate is 
who should benefit from the resources.  
The objective of this thesis is to quantify the resource rent in the Norwegian aquaculture 
industry during 2010-2017. I study this topic for two main reasons. First, to elucidate the benefit 
that accrues to the license holders. Second, to provide insights into the financial state of the 
industry. The results from the empirical analysis have significant policy implications, 
particularly in light of the ongoing debate of whether to impose a special tax on the industry.  
An important assumption in most existing research, either explicitly or implicitly, is that the 
license holder captures the entire resource rent (Boadway and Keen, 2015). This assumption 
holds if the license holder is vertically integrated and controls all parts of the production 
process, or if the other parts of the value chain are perfectly competitive. However, most firms 
rely on suppliers of goods and services, and demand tends to change rapidly. Thus, the accounts 
of the license holder may not contain the full cost of carrying the resource to the market because 
demand shifts can cause temporary market unbalances. I develop a model that accounts for the 
full production cost, including the opportunity cost of capital, in all stages of the production 
process. Hence, I contribute to the literature by suppressing the need for this assumption by 
quantifying the rent in all divisions of the value chain. I term the rent in other parts of the value 
chain, rent shifting.   
My thesis makes two main contributions to the existing literature. First, it provides a 
comprehensive bottom-up analysis of resource rent in Norwegian aquaculture. Second, to the 
best of my knowledge, this is the first study to quantify the rent shifting effects empirically. 
Thus, my study provides new insight into the natural resource rent generation process.  
Based on data from more than 700 legal entities during 2010-2017, I find an accumulated 
resource rent of NOK 74.9 billion, out of which six percent is rent shifting. I also use the farming 
rent estimates to calculate the value of a license to NOK 139.9 million, or  NOK 179.4 thousand 
per tonne of licensed capacity, which is very close to the average price of  NOK 195 thousand 
per tonne paid in the most recent auction (DoF, 2018). This price estimate is intriguing because 
                                                 
1 World’s second largest salmon farming nation (see chapter 2). 
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it implies that the cost of new licenses equals the expected net present value of the resource rent 
in perpetuity.  
There are few empirical studies on resource rent in the Norwegian aquaculture industry (see 
chapter 2). In fact, to the best of my knowledge, there is only one directly comparable study to 
date. Based on a sample of 68 percent of the registered farming firms in Norway, Flaaten and 
Pham (2019) estimate the resource rent in 2016 to NOK 15.774 billion, or NOK 18.57 per 
kilogram of sold fish. They rely on the vertical integration assumption mentioned above, and 
the comparable estimate from my analysis is NOK 18.50 per kilogram (19.72 when I include 
rent shifting). Further, they utilize the Faustmann framework and estimate the value of a license 
to NOK 138 million, or NOK 176 thousand per tonne of licensed capacity.  
Greaker (2018) estimates the resource rent to NOK 27 billion in 2016. These results are 
preliminary and stem from ongoing research. He applies information from the national accounts 
of Norway and a cost of capital of four percent, which is half the cost of capital in Flaaten and 
Pham (2019). Adjusting the cost of capital in my model yields a comparable estimate of NOK 
23.5 and 25.9 billion, without and with rent shifting, respectively.    
Altogether, the Norwegian aquaculture industry benefits greatly from the protective regulations 
and generates substantial resource rent. This conclusion is gripping because it provides new 
insights into one of the central issues of the ongoing debate, namely whether there is resource 
rent in the industry. Furthermore, the analysis also provides evidence that the resource rent is 
not a recent phenomenon, as many claims.  
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. In chapter 2, I introduce the business of 
aquaculture, including historical development and current trends. In chapter 3, I introduce the 
theoretical concept of resource rent, and I present a selection of relevant literature. In chapter 
4, I present the analytical framework for my empirical analysis. Chapter 5 explains how I build 
my data set and show summary statistics on its content. Chapter 6 presents and discusses the 
empirical results. Finally, chapter 7 concludes the thesis.  
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2. The Norwegian Aquaculture Industry  
The modern history of Norwegian aquaculture began in the mid-1950s but did not become 
commercialized until the late 1960s and early 1970s. The 60s and 70s are known as the 
pioneering era where collective effort and exchange of experiences were essential to solving 
the enigma of successful marine cultivation. Norway benefits from its long and fragmented 
coastline consisting of a vast number of islands, islets, and fjords that provide great protection 
against wind and waves from the open ocean. Combined with a high replacement rate of pure 
water at favorable temperatures, it provides superb biological and physical conditions for 
aquaculture production. The present industry includes fish, mollusks, crustaceans, 
echinoderms, and algae. The by far most important species is Atlantic salmon followed by 
rainbow trout, which accounts for about 94 and 5 percent of the total production, respectively 
(DoF, 2019b). Because of its relative importance, I limit the remainder of this thesis to only 
consider salmon and rainbow trout cultivation (henceforth aquaculture).   
Atlantic salmon refers to the Salmo Salar species in the Salmonidae family. The fish is easily 
recognizable on its streamlined body with a dark blue top and shiny scales along the sides. 
Rainbow trout, on the other hand, refers to the Oncorhynchus Mykiss species in the same 
family. Rainbow trout exists in two basic forms as either resident or migrating. One often refers 
to the latter as steelhead. The fish resembles Atlantic salmon except for a less streamlined body 
and lots of dark spots along the sides. Both Atlantic salmon and rainbow trout (steelhead) are 
anadromous, which means they spend most of their lives in the sea but migrates to freshwater 
for reproduction purposes. Further, both species are cold-blooded animals and therefore does 
not rely on internal sources of heat for regulating body temperature. As a result, the fish are 
very efficient in both energy and protein retention compared to onshore animals. Also, the fish 
have substantially higher edible yield and lower feed conversion ratio than most other animal 
sources of protein, e.g., pork, poultry, lamb, etc. (Mowi, 2019)  
This chapter is structured as follows. In section 2.1, I introduce the value chain and production 
cycle. In section 2.2, I present current production characteristics, including production costs. 
Section 2.3 covers commodity prices and markets. Section 2.4 reports important industry 
players. Section 2.5 describes the relevant parts of the regulatory framework. Finally, section 
2.6 presents ongoing technological trends and developments in both the farming industry and 
the service and supplier industry.     
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2.1 The Aquaculture Value Chain  
The salmon and rainbow trout production cycle takes approximately three years from start to 
finish and involves a wide range of sequential activities. In short, the process starts with roe 
(eggs) and ends up as fillets on dinner tables all over the world. Figure 1 divides the cycle into 
six phases, and the remainder of this subchapter elaborates on each step chronologically.  
 
Figure  1. The Aquaculture Value Chain 
 
Source: Bremnes Seashore AS (2017), Author  
Every generation of fish starts with a careful selection of roe according to the farmer’s 
preferences. Historically, preferences were simply which river the fish originated from, often 
based on the perception that rougher rivers fostered more robust fish (Svarstad, 2001). Today, 
owing to genomic selection and systematic breeding, preferences are more specific and include, 
e.g., meat quality and color, growth speed, improved immune system, sterility, etc. (Aquagen 
AS, 2019b). When the farmer has decided on the preferred genetical characteristics, the roe 
producer mixes the appropriate eggs with milt to initiate fertilization. The fertilized eggs spend 
the next seven to nine weeks under close surveillance in small freshwater incubation tanks. 
When the eggs are adequately robust, typically at the eye-roe stage,2 they are ready for smolt 
production facilities in phase two of the production cycle.   
At the smolt plant, technicians reinstate the roe to small incubation tanks. After approximately 
500 degree days, the roe hatches to larvae. Subsequently, technicians transfer the larvae to large 
freshwater tanks where they spend the next six months. During this time, the larvae evolve to 
Fry, then Parr, and eventually undergo a metamorphosis termed “smoltification” to develop the 
ability to live in waters with high salinity. The growth process from larvae to smolt implies a 
                                                 
2 When the embryo develops eyes that are visible from the outside as two black dots.   
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weight gain of about one hundred times the initial body weight. Normally, the fish weighs 
between 80 and 150 grams upon transfer to a life at sea. 
Specialized fish-carrying vessels, commonly referred to as wellboats, transport the fish from 
the smolt facility to sea-based production sites, called localities. A typical locality consists of 
four to eight pens and a feed barge. Each pen is 120-200 meters in circumference and holds up 
to two hundred thousand individuals with a maximum fish density of 25 kilograms per cubic 
meter of water (Forskrift om drift av akvakulturanlegg, 2004). The barge contains silos and a 
feeding bridge where technicians carefully monitor appetite and control the feeding schedule 
accordingly. A typical feeding schedule suggests an appropriate portion size based on a function 
of growth rate3, feed conversation ratio, and average fish size.  
Present farming technology uses open-net solutions where water passes freely through the pen. 
On a company level, the open-net technology is beneficial since it does not require energy to 
supply new and oxygen-rich water. In addition, it utilizes water currents and thus does not 
require any systems to collect and handle waste, e.g., fecal, excess feed, remedies, etc. On the 
negative side, open-net technology is vulnerable to a wide range of externalities either from 
nature itself or from nearby localities, where transmission of parasites and diseases are the most 
common issues. In recent years, parasites (predominantly lice) have been a significant cost 
driver for the farming firms, see below. On a public level, the open-net technology puts 
substantial pressure on the ecosystem and its ability to process the careless release of waste and 
various medical remedies. Further, the farming pens provide ideal conditions for exponential 
procreation of parasites, which in turn negatively affect wild fish. Figure 2 illustrates the 
intricate relationship between the ecosystem and a fish pen. The direction of the arrows 
indicates the force of impact, and the sum of all variables define the animal welfare inside the 
net. For a detailed assessment of impacts, see Agnalt et al. (2018) (in Norwegian).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Growth rate is a function of feed ingredients and temperature. Feed producers provide feed-specific growth 
tables with average fish size (y-axis) and temperature (x-axis).    
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Figure  2. Open-net technology and the ecosystem 
 
Sources: Inspired by Agnalt et al. (2018). 
Owing to the constant threat of negative externalities, farmers keep the fish under close 
surveillance, and authorities demand weekly reports on, e.g., lice levels. When lice levels 
exceed a specific threshold, it requires mitigation actions.4 Farmers have at least six options to 
cope with the lice issue. First, they can use medical remedies such as Alphamax, Betamax, or 
Salmosan. However, lice have developed medical resistance to several of them because of rapid 
procreation and strong adaptability (Helgesen et al., 2019). Second, they can apply non-medical 
treatment methods, e.g., Thermolicer, Optilicer, Skamik, or wellboats. These options work by 
pumping the fish through a rather complex machinery and either brushing the lice off (Skamik), 
use heated water that most lice cannot survive (Thermolicer and Optilicer), or expose the lice 
to freshwater (wellboats).5 Although the methods have a reasonable efficiency, they inflict 
severe stress and discomfort upon the fish with associated elevated mortality (Hjeltnes et al., 
2019). Besides, they require significant manual labor and large investments in equipment. A 
third method is to use medical feed, e.g., slice. Slice involves adding a substance to the feed 
pellets (emamectin benzoate), which the fish absorbs and distributes to its tissue. Subsequently, 
when a louse attaches to the fish and starts eating from the skin, the substance paralyzes the 
                                                 
4 The threshold is set to an average of 0.5 female ovigerous lice per fish (minor seasonal variations), see 2.5 laws 
and regulations below.  
5 Some wellboats carry mechanical solutions in addition to the ability to treat with freshwater.  
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louse by blocking nerve impulses, and it dies (MSD Animal Health AS, 2012). A fourth method 
is to release cleaner fish, e.g., lumpfish, wrasse, etc. into the pen to eat the lice. This approach 
is becoming increasingly popular amongst farmers, and the industry releases about fifty million 
cleaners into the pens annually (DoF, 2019b). A fifth method is to use chemicals, such as 
hydrogen peroxide. Although this method has a rich tradition, farmers rarely use it today 
because of its potentially damaging effect on wildlife (Agnalt et al., 2018). The sixth and last 
method is an early harvest, which farmers generally regard as a last resort due to high alternative 
costs.  
After 14 to 22 months at the locality with frequent treatments and daily care, the fish is ready 
for harvest with an ideal weight of close to five kilograms. Figure 3 depicts the average weight 
distribution of sold fish in 2018 measured in gutted weight equivalents (GWE)6.  
 
Figure  3. Size distribution in 2018 
Sources: NASDAQ (2019) 
A wellboat carries the livestock from the locality to a processing plant where it deposits the fish 
into holding pens or directly into the factory. The former is a small pen situated in direct 
connection to the factory where the fish stays for approximately 24 hours to de-stress from 
transportation. De-stressing is important to lower the levels of lactic acid and cortisol, which 
results in improved meat quality (Skjervold et al., 2001).  
The first step of the processing phase is to transfer the fish into one or several large chilling 
tanks filled with cold water. In the chilling tanks, the fish adapts to the cold water and further 
                                                 
6 Gutted weight equivalent is a standardized weight measure set forward by NS9417:2012, and represents the 
weight of a whole fish emptied for blood and entrails.   
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lowers its stress levels, which in turn delays the onset of rigor mortis7 and is particularly 
important for filleting later-on. Following the chilling tanks, the fish continue into the 
slaughtering machines, where it receives a sharp blow to the head combined with cutting the 
main artery located behind the gills. Then the fish bleeds out to remove any blood from the 
tissue. The final step of the initial processing phase is gutting, which implies the removal of 
entrails and flushing of the meat, followed by a quality grading. Each fish receives a grade as 
either superior (best), ordinary, or production-grade (worst), based on several criteria, e.g., 
melanin spots, scale loss, coloring, deformation, wounds, etc. The grade ultimately determines 
the price, see below. One typically refers to the weight of the gutted fish as “gutted weight”, 
which is the preferred unit of measurement used throughout this thesis. The entire process up 
to this point, including packaging of the gutted fish, is known as primary processing, and 
everything that follows is known as secondary processing.   
Secondary processing includes any value-adding activity and appears in a wide range of 
formats. Typically, secondary processing involves the removal of the head and tail, filleting, 
and trimming (Johansson, 2017). Then the fish is prepared as, e.g., fillets with or without skin, 
loins, smoked, burgers, and so forth.  
The final step of the production cycle is sales. Norwegian farmers export about 95 percent of 
the domestic production, mostly as gutted fish whole fish (Mowi, 2019). As a result, one can 
eat Norwegian farmed salmon and rainbow trout in most parts of the world, see below.  
This concludes my brief introduction to the value chain of Norwegian salmon and rainbow trout 
aquaculture. The most important takeaway is the understanding of externalities in the farming 
phase and the interrelationship between farming and the ecosystem. Also, it is important to note 
the length of the production cycle with the implications that farmers decide future volumes 
three years in advance. I now proceed to present some key characteristics of the industry with 
an emphasis on the farming phase.  
 
 
                                                 
7 Known as death stiffness where muscles tighten because of chemical changes in the tissue.  
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2.2 Production Metrics  
The global production of salmon and rainbow trout in a marine environment reached 2.5 million 
tonnes in 2017, up from 1.7 million tonnes in 2010. Table 1 reports the eight largest producers 
in the world, and the relative magnitude of Norway is evident. In fact, Norway typically 
produces approximately half of the global supply and almost twice the quantity of the second 
largest production nation, Chile. Although I focus on Norway exclusively in the remainder of 
this subchapter, it is essential to note that Norway is the largest but not the only producer in the 
world.  
 
Table 1. Global production of Atlantic salmon and rainbow trout in a marine environment 
Country  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Norway 994 1123 1307 1240 1327 1376 1321 1303 
Chile 320 463 610 602 754 703 616 688 
UK 156 159 165 165 181 177 167 193 
Canada 102 110 116 98 86 122 124 122 
Faroe Islands 48 60 77 76 86 81 83 87 
Australia 32 37 44 43 42 48 56 53 
US 20 19 19 19 19 19 16 15 
Ireland 16 13 13 9 9 13 16 18 
Others 24 30 25 45 37 31 31 34 
Total  1 711 2 014 2 375 2 297 2 542 2 570 2 431 2 513 
Notes: These are the only figures reported as whole fish equivalents (WFE) in this thesis.  
Source: FAO (2019) 
 
Figure 4 depicts the development of both output volumes and the corresponding value of 
Norwegian production during the last twenty years. Production and value have increased 
twofold and fourfold, respectively. At the same time, the aggregate global production volume 
has soared by more than 200 percent (FAO, 2019). Consequentially, the industry has been 
highly successful in developing new markets and extracting latent demand to cope with the 
production growth.   
Although improved production technology, including any biotechnology, has been the main 
driver behind the supply growth, one must also credit the regulatory framework. There are 
numerous examples of failed aquaculture industries around the world where the authorities 
suppressed the need for sustainability, or simply was unwilling to take the risk of establishing 
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a new biological industry (Asche and Bjørndal, 2011, Asche et al., 2014). In recent years, one 
must also ascribe some of the value development to a weak Norwegian krone (NOK).  
 
Figure  4. Quantity and value of sold fish, in constant 2018 prices 
 
Source: DoF (2019b), SSB (2019) 
 
Figure 5 depicts the development in production costs per kilogram of gutted fish. The cost was 
falling significantly from the mid-1980s to 2005. The most important explanation for the 
declining costs is technological innovation combined with the liberalization of parts of the 
aquaculture act. A particularly important regulatory change was the repealing of the ownership 
restrictions in 1991,8 and thus allowing for consolidation. As a result, farming firms started a 
process to exploit the suppressed potential for economies of scale (Bjørndal and Salvanes, 
1995). However, owing to problems related to biology combined with higher prices for feed 
ingredients, costs have been increasing steadily since 2005. 
Farmers typically report biological issues as part of other operating expenses in their financial 
statements. According to the profitability survey by the Directorate of Fisheries (2018a), other 
operating expenses account for approximately one-fourth of the total production cost per 
kilogram in 2017, compared to about nine percent in 2005. Although increased treatment 
activity and elevated mortality is an important cost driver, it is also essential to note that 
                                                 
8 Until 1991, the authorities required local ownership of all farms. No farming firm could own more than one 
concession (see below) nor own a majority stake in another farming firm.  
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increased usage of specialized suppliers of services, maintenance, and an overall stricter 
regulatory framework also fuels the other operating costs. Like most forms of meat production, 
feed is the largest cost constituent and accounts for about half of the total production cost 
Figure  5. Production cost per kilogram sold fish during 1998-2018 
 
 
 
Notes: The figure shows production cost per kilogram of sold fish in GWE kilograms.  
Source: DoF (2019b), SSB (2019) 
For the last ten years, farmers have been operating an average of 810 active localities yearly, 
with an average production of 1,394 tonnes. Figure 6 shows all active localities during 2018, 
including an outtake of the Hordaland county to illustrate how farms lie in relation to each other. 
As seen in the figure, farms are located relatively close to one another, and the potential for 
transmission of diseases and parasites is easily imaginable. 
This concludes the short introduction to both the global and the Norwegian production of 
salmon and rainbow trout. I now proceed to present the price development and market dynamics 
regarding exports.  
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Figure  6. Active localities during 2018 
Notes: Shows all active production sites during 2018 (totaling 838 different sites).  
Source: Mattilsynet (2019a) 
 
 
 
Hordaland  
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2.3 Pricing and Markets 
Farmers normally trade salmon and rainbow trout over the counter (OTC), either as spot 
transactions or by forward contracts. In addition to the trade of goods, Fish Pool serves as an 
international market place for buying and selling financial contracts with salmon as the 
underlying commodity. The purpose of this centralized market is to offer hedging and 
speculation possibilities for all stakeholders. Although industry players widely recognize the 
market, its size remains modest. In fact, only contracts equal to 67.5 thousand tonnes went 
through the system in 2017 (Fish Pool, 2018 ).  
Because of the OTC structuring, agencies such as Nasdaq rely on collecting price information 
from a representative panel of Norwegian exporters. As mentioned, farmers label fish as either 
superior, ordinary, or production-grade. The price quotes normally represent superior, which 
accounts for about 90-95 percent of the total quantity produced in Norway. Moreover, exporters 
operate with a set of size groups (weight) and report prices accordingly. The most common size 
groups are 3-4, 4-5, and 5-6 gutted weight kilograms. Typically, larger fish are more expensive. 
Figure 7 depicts the monthly average spot price per gutted weight kilogram during 1998-2018.   
Figure  7. Salmon price development during 1998-2018 
 
Notes: Monthly average salmon spot price per GWE kilogram.  
Source: NASDAQ (2019) 
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In 2018 the average price reached NOK 60 per kilogram and represented a 55 percent real 
increase from the average price of NOK 39 per kilogram in 1998. Despite the positive trend, 
the time series displays clear signs of significant volatility. Vertical bar (1) highlights a period 
with overproduction. The salmon market was very strong in the late 1990s, and farmers 
produced as much fish as possible (Skjeret et al., 2016). In fact, farmers produced 20 percent 
more fish in 1999 compared to 1998 (DoF, 2019b). Vertical bar (2) represents a demand 
increase resulting from an outbreak of bird flu, and salmon became a substitute for chicken and 
pushed prices up (Evans, 2006). Vertical bar (3) shows the effect of a supply shock from a 
disease outbreak in Chile (infectious salmon anemia) where prices soared because it opened the 
American market for Norwegian exporters (Alvial et al., 2012). In late 2011 one can see the 
result of a strong rebound of volumes from Chile as biological conditions normalized (also 
visible in table 1). Finally, vertical bar (4) shows yet another supply shock in Chile. This time 
from a severe algae attack combined with overall difficult biological conditions in Norway 
(Anderson et al., 2017, Hjeltnes et al., 2017). 
As figure 7 illustrates, the commodity price is vulnerable to exogenous shocks. One important 
explanation is the long production cycle of approximately three years. Thus, short-term supply 
adjustments are practically impossible (within reasonable borders). Economists often say that 
the short-term supply curve is steep.       
 
Most production nations rely on vast export markets with strong demand. Considering the 
general preference for fresh fish among customers, the main markets for most nations are often 
nearby, e.g., the most important markets for Norway is the EU, whereas the most important 
trade partner for Chile is the United States and South America (Mowi, 2019). One often refers 
to Asia as a shared market because it is far away from all major production nations. Thus, 
transportation costs (airfreight) are broadly similar. The United Kingdom is one exception from 
the exporting nations in the sense that most volumes are consumed within the UK (Mowi, 
2019).  
Given the relatively modest human population and substantial fish production, the domestic 
consumption of farmed fish in Norway only accounts for a marginal share of the total 
production. Specifically, Norwegians consume about five percent of the total production 
(Mowi, 2019). In 2018, the total export of salmon and rainbow trout from Norway reached 1.1 
million tonnes, out of which 96 percent was salmon (SSB, 2019). Figure 8 shows all countries 
where Norwegian exports were one hundred tonnes or more in 2018.   
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The largest importers of Norwegian salmon and rainbow trout were Poland, France, and 
Denmark, with a total import of 14, 10, and 8 percent of the total quantity, respectively. A large 
processing industry explains the former and the latter, and both countries re-export most of the 
quantity as value-added products to, e.g., Germany and France. The most important reason 
farmers export fish for processing (secondary) is to avoid tariffs. Norway is not an EU member 
and faces high tariffs (up to 13 percent) on secondary processed fish because the EU wants to 
protect its processing industry (Kvalvik et al., 2016). For this reason, many of the largest 
Norwegian farming groups have their own processing facilities abroad, e.g., Mowi ASA’s 
Morpol in Poland.  
Geographical considerations suggest that the EU will remain the most important market for 
Norwegian seafood also in the years to come (Mowi, 2019). However, a weak NOK, strong 
global population growth, and overall improving living conditions world-wide opens new 
possibilities for further expansion into new markets.  
Figure  8. Norway's most important export markets 
Notes: The map shows Norway’s most important export markets in 2018, where important implies more than or equal to one 
hundred tonnes. Both the color darkness and size of the dots represent volume: the higher volume, the darker and larger dots.  
Source: SSB (2019) 
 
Thus far, I have presented the production cycle, production metrics, pricing, and the markets. 
Now, I continue by introducing the most prominent salmon farming companies before I 
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conclude the chapter by presenting important laws and regulations in addition to some of the 
current trends and development projects that could largely impact the industry going forward.  
2.4 Industry Structure 
In 2017, there were 174 active salmon and rainbow trout companies in Norway. However, many 
of the firms are subsidiaries of large farming groups. Thus, by accounting for legal ownership, 
the number decreases to about one hundred firms. Further, according to calculations by Mowi 
(2019), 22 companies control eighty percent of the total production in Norway. Figure 9 depicts 
the development of the industry structure from 1999 to 2018. As mentioned, the consolidation 
process started in the early 1990s and continues to this date (to some extent). The top ten players 
with respect to harvest volumes contributed 22 percent to the total volume in 1999 compared 
to 67-69 percent in the last seven years. The price fall in 2000 (see vertical bar (1) in figure 7) 
triggered a wave of bankruptcies and associated acquisitions. The substantial consolidation 
between 2005 and 2007 shows the effect of introducing new production regulations (see MAB 
below). 
Figure  9. Top ten producers' share of total Norwegian supply during 1999-2018 
 
Source: DoF (2019b) 
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Table 2 reports the top ten largest farming groups in 2018 based on harvest quantities. Mowi 
ASA is the largest company, with approximately 20 percent of the national supply. In addition, 
the company produces about 130 thousand tonnes abroad, e.g., in the UK, North America, and 
Chile. In aggregate, the company is the largest salmon producer in the world (with solid 
margins). As seen in table 2, six out of ten companies are public (ASA).9 Implicitly, locally 
owned family businesses (AS) still control a significant share of the national production.  
 
Table 2. Top ten largest companies based on harvest volumes in 2018 
Company  Harvest in GWE tonnes In % of Population 
Mowi ASA 230 400 20.42  
Salmar ASA 142 500 12.63  
Lerøy Seafood ASA 137 800 12.22  
Cermaq AS 57 400 5.09  
Grieg Seafood ASA 46 100 4.09  
Nova Sea AS 37 900 3.36  
Nordlaks AS 36 100 3.20 
Norway Royal Salmon ASA 36 000 3.19  
Sinkaberg-Hansen AS 27 500 2.44  
Alsaker Fjordbruk AS  26 000 2.30  
Total  777 700 68.94  
Notes: The population refers to the total production by Norwegian farmers (approximately 1 128 100 GWE tonnes in 2018). 
The abbreviations “AS” and “ASA” refers to private and public companies, respectively.   
Source: Mowi (2019) 
2.5 Laws and Regulations 
The Norwegian aquaculture industry is subject to a rather complex legislative framework. This 
subchapter introduces the most important aspects of the framework with respect to the objective 
of this thesis. Specifically, I focus on licenses and production regulations. Also, I provide some 
insights into other relevant laws and regulations that are particularly important for the 
interpretation of the empirical results and the associated discussions, namely lice mitigation 
regulations.   
                                                 
9 Mitsubishi owns all the shares of Cermaq AS and is therefore indirectly public. Further, Mowi ASA controls 43 
percent of Nova Sea AS.  
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2.5.1 Licenses  
The aquaculture act of Norway (2005) aims to facilitate profitability and ensure the 
competitiveness of the industry within the borders of sustainable development. The law outlines 
a policy in favor of coastal communities to prevent depopulation. A key managerial tool to 
promote the achievement of objectives is a licensing scheme. Chapter three of the aquaculture 
act dictates that a license is a prerequisite for all marine-based cultivation activities in Norway. 
A license, or concession, gives the holder a right to cultivate specific species, in a certain 
quantity, in a specific geographical area.  
The general practice is that the authorities issue licenses continuously upon applications. 
However, this convention does not apply to sea-based salmon and rainbow trout concessions. 
Such permits exist in a fixed quantity and only allocated through (rare) public allocation rounds, 
in which the players compete either on a set of criteria or through auction to obtain additional 
permits. The reason salmon and rainbow trout receive different treatment compared to other 
species is largely its commercial potential that strongly encourages overexploitation.  
Technically, the present licensing scheme functions by regulating the maximum allowed 
standing biomass (MAB). The MAB is 780 tonnes of fish (live weight) per license in all 
counties except Troms and Finnmark, where the limit is 945 tonnes because of slower growth 
in colder waters. A company that owns more than one concession in a specific area can add 
them together to define a company level MAB for this area. The holder must tie each concession 
to specific localities that have individual MAB constraints rooted in site-specific characteristics, 
e.g., water quality, currents, seabed purity, wildlife, distance to other localities, etc. In general, 
a farmer can associate one license with a total of four localities.10 The median capacity of all 
Norwegian production sites is 3,120 tonnes, and the average production per license, measured 
in sold GWE tonnes, was 1,178 tonnes in 2017 (DoF, 2018a). One often refers to the company 
level MAB as a tool to limit production and the locality MAB as a method for protecting the 
environment. However, both levels work together to prevent the tragedy of the commons. The 
Directorate of Fisheries demands monthly biomass updates to enforce the legislation and have 
the power to impose penalties when appropriate.  
In addition to the traditional licenses described above, the authorities also issue licenses 
dedicated to educational purposes, broodfish, research, and development. The latter is a 
                                                 
10 Alternatively, six sites if they all use the exact same licenses.  
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temporary scheme that issues project-specific concessions to facilitate significant innovation 
by reducing the overall investment risk of the undertaker. The purpose is to foster technology 
that can solve one or several of the environmental and area challenges the industry is currently 
facing. I return to some of the specific projects below.  
In 2017, the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Fisheries officially introduced new legislation that 
grants farmers with an opportunity to grow their MAB. The new policy outlined a system that 
divides the coastline into thirteen different production areas and assigns a status of either red, 
yellow, or green to each area depending on the overall lice situation. A green status implies a 
MAB increase, yellow is unchanged, and red triggers a MAB reduction. The magnitude of 
change in biomass is six percent. In late 2017, the authorities assigned a green status to eight 
areas (1,7,8,9,10,11,12, and 13), yellow to three (2,5, and 6), and red to two (3 and 4). Two 
percent of the green capacity was dedicated to expanding existing licenses, whereas four percent 
was sold at a public auction as new licenses. The weighted average cost per tonne at the auction 
reached NOK 195 thousand. Figure 10 depicts the distribution of production areas in addition 
to the realized auction prices per tonne in each of the green areas. Although two of the areas 
received a red status, the authorities will not enforce any reductions until the next status 
assessment scheduled in late-2019. In total, there were 1,041 concessions for commercial 
farming with a combined MAB of 909 thousand tonnes in Norway by the end of 2018.  
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Figure  10. Production areas and realized auction prices at the June 2018 auction 
 
Notes: Shows the realized auction prices in the June 2018 auction. The x-axis shows the weighted average price per tonne, and 
the y-axis denotes each area. The bubble size represents the total number of tonnes purchased in each area.  
Sources: DoF (2019b), SSB (2019) 
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2.5.2 Other Relevant Legislation 
Adding to the aquaculture act mentioned above, the industry is also subject other laws and 
regulations, e.g., the food act (2003), the animal welfare act (2009), the water resource act 
(2000), the pollution act (1981), the harbor act (2009), the salmon and inland fisheries act 
(1992), the product control act (1976), regulations concerning daily operations of fish farms 
(2004), regulations on technical specifications of floating fish farms (2011), regulations 
concerning lice mitigation in fish farms (2012), etc. Of course, the industry is also subject to 
generalized Norwegian legislation, such as the working environment act (2005), the taxation 
act (1999), the national insurance act (1997), and so forth. A complete introduction to these 
laws and regulations is beyond the scope of this brief industry introduction. However, it is 
useful for the discussion in chapter six to have basic knowledge of the regulations concerning 
lice mitigation.  
Lice are natural ectoparasites and feed off the mucus, skin, and blood of the host fish. Although 
modest levels of lice are not a major inconvenience to the host, higher levels lead to open 
wounds that, in turn, can cause anemia, difficulties with osmosis regulation, and lethal 
infections (Hjeltnes et al., 2019). Fish farms create ideal procreation conditions by having many 
potential hosts in a confined area. One major concern is how unnaturally high lice spawning 
activity in fish farms affects wild living salmon (Kristoffersen et al., 2017).  
Although a salmon louse evolves through eight stages in its biological lifecycle (Heuch et al., 
2000), the industry operates with three main classifications depending on the maturity of the 
louse: non-mobile (youngest), mobile, and female ovigerous (oldest). The regulations 
concerning lice mitigation in fish farms (2012) dictates that farmers must monitor and report 
the number of lice in each category weekly (small seasonal variations). The reported lice figure 
for each category represents an average of lice per fish based on a sample of between ten to 
twenty fish per pen. Although the authorities require lice numbers for each category, only the 
female ovigerous is subject to strict regulations in terms of maximum levels. For most of the 
year, the average female ovigerous per fish cannot exceed 0.5 without further actions from the 
farmer (e.g., treatments). 11 The Norwegian Food Safety Authority has the power to impose 
penalties if the farmers fail to adhere to the requirements.     
                                                 
11 The limit is 0.2 six week per year: from week 16 to 21 in all counties south of Norland, and from week 21 to 
26 in Nordland, Troms, and Finnmark.   
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This concludes the brief introduction to the most relevant legislation. The key takeaway from 
this subchapter is an understanding of the licensing scheme. Further, having a working 
understanding of the lice mitigation legislation, which is particularly important for the 
discussion of rent shifting effects in chapter 6. Now, I proceed to the last section in this 
introductory chapter, where I present some of the ongoing trends and developments that could 
largely impact the future of aquaculture.  
2.6 Ongoing Trends and Developments  
Fostered by a combination of high fish prices, increasing production costs, limited growth 
prospects of current production technology, and highly favorable development licenses, farmers 
are now developing several new systems that could greatly impact the future of salmon and 
rainbow trout cultivation. Figure 11 represents some of the innovations within core production 
technology.  
Figure  11. Ongoing projects concerning core production methods 
 
 
Sources: Mørenot AS (2018), MNH Produksjon AS (2018), Hauge Aqua AS (2018), Bulandet Miljøfisk AS (2018) 
The first picture from the left represents ocean-based farming. The basic idea is to make new 
areas feasible for cultivation by constructing farms that can withstand the forces of nature at 
exposed locations. Advocates for this technology argue that it lowers the horizontal 
transmission potential in addition to having a lower impact on the ecosystem, e.g., by being 
located at a great distance to salmon rivers, cleaner water, deeper areas, etc. Salmar ASA is at 
the forefront of this technology and slaughtered their first-generation from the world’s first 
ocean farm (the one in the picture) in late 2018 with promising results. The company expresses 
confidence in its vision of ocean rigs as an essential part of the future of aquaculture (Salmar 
ASA, 2018).  
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The second picture from the left represents semi-closed farming methods, where the idea is to 
establish a permanent barrier in the upper levels of the sea where the lice normally exist (Hevrøy 
et al., 2003). Midt-Norsk Havbruk AS is at the forefront of this technology and currently 
develops a semi-closed pen “Aquatraz” made of steel. A cheaper alternative that builds on 
existing plastic pens is fabric lice skirts, which have the same basic functioning as the new pens. 
However, modern semi-closed pens incorporate a lot more than just lice protection. First, it 
pumps water from great depths to renew the water in the closed section, which ensures oxygen-
rich water with optimal temperature. Second, the installation facilitates easy cleaning to 
improve hygiene. Third, it has automatic systems for gathering fish in case of treatments, 
deliveries, or sorting, which significantly lowers the stress levels of the fish. Finally, it eases 
and safes the daily operations for the workforce.      
The third picture from the left represents closed-pen farming methods, where farmers keep the 
fish in a fully controlled environment. Most ongoing projects involve a continuous renewal of 
water inside the pen from great depths by using the same pumping technology as the “Aquatraz” 
above. Further, the technology collects any waste products, which allows for alternative usage 
of highly applicable raw materials, for example, as fertilizer or biofuel. Besides, it also reduces 
the biological pressure on the ecosystem. As a result, the technology is safer on the environment 
and is less likely to suffer from negative externalities. However, a big challenge for this 
technology is to ensure adequate animal welfare and water quality. Further, the usage of pumps 
to continuously renew water implies high energy costs and a significant vulnerability towards 
any power-outs.  
Finally, the right-hand side picture represents land-based farming methods. Most systems use 
a recycling system for its water, often referred to as RAS (Recirculating Aquaculture Systems), 
which implies that the plant can operate without having an endless supply of high-quality water. 
That said, even the most advanced RAS solutions require a certain water replacement regularly. 
The biggest advantage of this technology is that farmers can produce fish closer to, or in, the 
end markets and save transportation costs. Although land-based solutions have many advocates, 
the established sea-based farmers tend to focus their resources and knowledge of fish biology 
towards improving sea-based production forms, e.g., through releasing larger smolt (see below) 
rather than investing in land-based grow-out facilities. The biggest drawback of land-based 
production methods is high energy costs and substantial capital expenditures.  
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As the industry has become increasingly more advanced, there has been a strong demand for 
goods and services. For this reason, the aquaculture industry consists of a lot more than just 
farming companies. In fact, the aquaculture service and supplier industry grow at even higher 
rates. Typically, farmers rely on purchasing everything from roe to equipment and wellboat 
services from external companies. Figure 12 represents some of the most notable ongoing trends 
in the service and supplier industry that could affect the future of farming and help solve 
existing challenges.    
Figure  12. Ongoing trends and projects in the service and supplier industry 
 
Sources: Aquagen AS (2019a), Lerøy Seafood ASA (2018), Napier AS (2019), Unknown (available at 
datafloq.com/read/artificial-intelligence-future-of-programming/5124).  
The first picture from the left represents advancements in genetics and biology. Farmers show 
an increasing willingness to pay for new products that claim to prevent lice or ensure resistance 
against various diseases. There are currently several interesting vaccines in development in 
addition to considerable QTL effort to breed lice-repelling fish.  
The second picture from the left represents post-smolt production, which is a semi land-based 
farming method. Farmers are investing substantially in growing larger smolt on land. The basic 
idea is to limit the exposure time at the locality. By keeping the fish on land up to weights of 
500 grams to one kilogram, one effectively reduces the time at sea by approximately half. Thus, 
lowering the biological risk significantly. However, there are still issues that need solving, e.g., 
challenges with early sexual maturity.  
The third picture from the left represents processing vessels, which replaces wellboats in the 
harvest stage of the production cycle. Processing vessels have “stun and bleed” systems that 
kill the fish at the time of loading and stores the fish in chilling wells. Consequently, the fish 
does not depend on oxygen-rich water nor room to swim during transport, which implies that 
the vessel can carry more fish per cubic meter of well capacity and use completely enclosed 
wells even at long-duration transit. There is also one fully functioning slaughtering vessel in 
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operation, “Norwegian Gannet”. This vessel conducts the entire primary processing stage 
onboard (except grading and packaging) while transiting to a specialized facility in Denmark. 
Although the technology is highly efficient, it receives considerable political resistance in 
Norway because it has the potential to threaten jobs at processing facilities along the coast.          
Finally, the last picture from the left represents the usage of data. Farmers collect considerable 
amounts of data from their operations but do not utilize its full potential in decision making. To 
further develop systems to ease planning and improve predictability is of high value in 
distributing limited resources. Many companies are currently developing systems for automatic 
feeding, biomass control, lice prediction, etc.  
2.7 Summary 
The Norwegian aquaculture industry has evolved greatly from its inception in the 1950s. Today, 
Norway is the world’s second largest seafood exporter in terms of value. High profitability, 
combined with challenging biological conditions and overall strict regulations, has resulted in 
considerable ongoing innovation and development that could largely impact the industry going 
forward. The most important takeaways from this introductory chapter is an overall 
understanding of the aquaculture industry, together with a more detailed understanding of the 
intricate relationship between present production technology and the ecosystem, which define 
the very premises of the current regulatory system.   
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3. Theory and Related Literature 
In this chapter, I review and summarize the large body of literature on resource rent with an 
emphasis on empirical work. Despite the increased importance of aquaculture in the world 
economy (FAO, 2018), issues related to resource rent in the industry has yet to receive 
significant attention from economists. For this reason, most of the research presented below 
covers other resource industries, particularly the somewhat relatable fishing industry. The 
purpose of this review is to establish expectations for my empirical analysis in addition to 
uncovering potential gaps in the existing literature. In this chapter, I start by introducing the 
theoretical concept of resource rent, followed by a review of the existing literature. Next, I 
discuss the implications of the findings from the literature review for my empirical analysis of 
resource rent in the Norwegian aquaculture industry in addition to highlighting potential gaps 
in the existing literature.   
3.1 The Theoretical Concept of Resource Rent  
In a competitive market without any form of entry restrictions, one would expect a frim with 
positive profits to encourage entry to that industry. Conversely, one expects negative profits to 
trigger altered behavior or exit from the same industry (Varian, 1978). Thus, a competitive 
market induces players, both existing and aspiring, to continuously innovate to produce the 
underlying good or service at the lowest possible cost. Following this reasoning, the optimal 
level of production in a competitive market is the level where the marginal production costs 
equal the market price, i.e., it is optimal to produce (and sell) one extra (marginal) unit if the 
income from selling the marginal unit exceeds the production costs of that unit. Economists 
often refer to the intersection between marginal costs and demand (revenue) as market 
equilibrium, in which the long-term variable profit is equal to zero for all firms.12  
Economic profit, by definition, represents the difference between revenue and the total costs, 
including opportunity costs of capital, of supplying a good or service to the market. It follows 
from this definition that a competitive firm earns economic profits if the marginal cost exceeds 
the average cost in equilibrium. Such positive differences cannot hold for competitive markets 
in the long run due to the attraction of new entrants. However, the positive economic profit can 
                                                 
12 Under the assumption of homogeneous firms.  
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persist in the long run if there are any constraints to the supply side, e.g., scarcity of resources, 
or political motives (Varian, 1978).  
The supply side in the Norwegian aquaculture industry is subject to constraints due to the 
scarcity of the underlying resources. Current managerial principles of the nation’s natural 
resources aim to ensure sustainable exploitation that does not impair the long-run productivity 
of the resources (Becker et al., 1997, Ministry of Trade Industry and Fisheries, 2015). As 
mentioned, licenses are the most important tool to ensure sustainable development, and given 
the limited growth in the number of issued licenses during the last seven-eight years, it is 
reasonable to assume that concessions are a significant bottleneck for further production 
growth. For this reason, the only way farmers can increase output is to use more intensive 
farming methods, e.g., high growth feed, size separation techniques, postponing treatments, 
etc., which enables them to produce more within the same maximum allowed biomass 
constraint. Such methods imply higher marginal costs and consequentially increasing average 
costs. Thus, marginal costs are higher than average costs in the equilibrium, and the industry 
should experience positive economic profits from scarce resources. 
Sustained economic profit is a privilege to the holders of licenses since we know from above 
that such profits cannot exist in the long run in a competitive market. As a result, the commercial 
value of access to the resources must be equal to the difference between profits in the regulated 
market minus profits in a non-regulated market. A simple production function adapted from 
Varian (1978) clarifies the concept:  
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 =  𝑝∗𝑦∗ −  𝑐(𝑦∗) (1) 
 
where 𝑝∗is the price of output given the optimal quantity 𝑦∗, and 𝑐(𝑦∗) is the total cost of 
producing 𝑦∗. Drawing on the principles from above, the value of a resource must be equal to 
the positive profits. Thus, the owner of a resource can lend it to any rational producer for a sum 
equal to 𝑝∗𝑦∗ − 𝑐(𝑦∗), which in principle, is equivalent to a rent payment of a fixed factor. This 
value is what economists term “resource rent”, namely the economic profit from exploiting 
natural resources. The profits in the industry are due to the rent on scare resources, and thus the 
long-run operational profits will still be zero in equilibrium (Varian, 1978).  
The concept stems from the seminal works of Adam Smith (1776) and David Ricardo (1817), 
both of which wanted to distinguish between the efficiency gains of the producer (e.g., skills, 
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technology, etc.) and the benefits from the natural resource itself. The literature separates 
between several different kinds of rent, for example, differential rent, scarcity rent, and quasi 
rent. Economists often refer to the former as Ricardian rent, after the late David Ricardo. 
According to Ricardo (1817), there are situations where site-specific characteristics are more 
favorable in one area compared to another, and thus the same amount of capital and labor will 
yield different outputs depending on the production site. In aquaculture, such differences might 
be due to, e.g., water purity/quality, currents, temperature, bathymetry, weather exposure, 
horizontal transmission pressure, etc.  
Figure 13 depicts a scenario with three different fish farms (1), (2), and (3). A key assumption 
of the figure is that all farms are price takers; that is, neither farm is large enough to affect 
market prices. Further, all farms are operating optimally. The blue shaded area(s) represents the 
differential rent (DR). AC is the average cost, and MC is the marginal cost of production.  
Figure  13. Differential rent (Ricardian) 
  
Source: Luchsinger and Müller (2003) 
The figure clearly illustrates that Farm (1) benefits from higher quality resources by having 
lower costs of exploitation, since the blue shaded area is larger than the corresponding area for 
Farm (2). Farm (3), on the other hand, suffers from poor production conditions with the result 
of relatively high operational costs and no differential rent. The key takeaway from Figure 13 
is that parts of the rent stems from the quality of the resource itself and varies across production 
sites. Being unable to adjust quantities upwards in the event of increased demand facilitates a 
situation where demand can exceed the supply and prices increase. The rent that stems from 
such scarcity is by economists referred to as scarcity rent. 
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Scarcity rent arises when demand exceeds supply and is only possible in the long run if supply 
is subject to constraints. Figure 14 depicts the formation of scarcity rent (SR).  
Figure  14. Scarcity Rent 
 
Source: Rothman (2000), Luchsinger and Müller (2003), Author  
In Figure 14, the demand shifts upwards and fosters a price increase from 𝑝0 to 𝑝1. The legally 
enforced scarcity of the resources (MTB constraints) prevents farmers from adjusting Q to 
establish a new equilibrium where 𝑝1 = 𝑀𝐶. As a result, SR is positive and corresponds to the 
dark-blue shaded area. An interesting feature of the SR is that it can generate abnormal profits 
in marginal firms, as seen by Farm (3). Thus, even the less favorable localities are now 
generating substantial rent. Because of the central role of regulations in forming scarcity, one 
may refer to SR in this situation as “regulatory rent”. 
Both DR and SR originate from the resource itself and therefore make up the resource rent. 
However, it is essential to note that managerial efforts (e.g., investments, firm structure, etc.) 
and technology do affect the magnitude of the rent generated (Bjørndal et al., 2013). Further, 
considering the relative size of Norwegian production, it is reasonable to assume a degree of 
market power with associated potential for monopoly rent. Therefore, the amount of rent that a 
resource generates depends upon the collective behavior of both the exploiters and the resource 
owners (Boadway and Flatters, 1993). For this reason, one typically assumes that exploiters 
seek to maximize the net present value of economic profits and thus aim to maximize the 
resource rent by their decisions, e.g., all investments are value-adding, etc. The last type of rent 
I cover in this theoretical introduction is quasi rent.   
Quasi rent (QR), also known as intra-marginal rent, stems from differences among producers 
(farmers) due to strategic actions, e.g., new technology, economies of scale, procedures, skills 
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of the workforce, branding, etc. In contrast to the resource rent, competitors tend to mitigate the 
quasi rent in the long run by adopting similar strategies (Luchsinger and Müller, 2003). 
Consequentially, the quasi rent has a low expected value in a mature industry. There is, 
however, no clear indication that the aquaculture industry has reached maturity. In fact, the 
evidence indicates the opposite. There are still large differences between how firms operate, 
and the industry has yet to solve core issues related to, e.g., biology. As a result, several major 
ongoing projects could impact the industry greatly in the future. Thus, one should expect some 
degree of quasi rent in the Norwegian fish farming industry.   
Figure 15 conceptualizes the resource rent in the Norwegian aquaculture industry. The output 
has a theoretical maximum in 𝑄𝑀𝐴𝐵 which is lower than the free-competition equilibrium of 
𝑄0, which corresponds to an upward shift in prices from 𝑃0 to 𝑃𝑀𝐴𝐵. As a result, the scarce 
resources generate resource rent equal to DR+SR minus potential QR. The methodology in 
chapter four outlines an empirical strategy to estimate the absolute value of the shaded area.   
Figure  15. Conceptualizing resource rent in the Norwegian aquaculture industry 
 
 
Source: Author 
Thus far, I have elaborated on the concept of resource rent. I now proceed to review parts of 
the existing literature on the subject, with emphasis on the empirical work. That is, the focus is 
on papers that have quantified the rent in various resource industries. The primary motivation 
for estimating resource rent is twofold. First, rent represents the value of a nation’s natural 
resources and thus should be part of national wealth calculations together with real capital, 
32 
 
human capital, and financial capital (Lindholt, 2000). Second, and perhaps the most prominent 
motivation, to assess who benefits from the natural resources and consider potential rent capture 
schemes to redistribute potentially skewed benefits.    
Rent capture is when authorities, on behalf of the public (the resource owners), aims to collect 
parts of the rent through various schemes, e.g., royalties, taxes, auctions, etc. to benefit the 
public and not the exploiters exclusively (Rothman, 2000). Rent capture and the effectiveness 
of various capturing strategies are topics for a substantial body of literature, see for example 
Garnaut and Ross (1975), Copithorne et al. (1985), Heaps and Helliwell (1985), Amundsen et 
al. (1992), Grafton (1993), Osmundsen (1995) and Zhang (1997). However, rent capture is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, and I focus on the literature that documents and quantifies the 
resource rent in various industries. I limit my review to studies in Europe with the most attention 
towards the Nordics. I start by reviewing the existing work within fisheries economics, followed 
by a few examples from hydropower and petroleum. I conclude the review by assessing the 
very limited body of literature on rent in aquaculture.   
3.2 Literature Review  
Gordon (1954) initiated the modern literature on resource rent in fisheries in his seminal paper 
“The economic theory of a common property resource: the fishery”. In this paper, he addresses 
the lack of fundamental economic understanding among biologists by developing a simple 
bioeconomic model. One of his most important contributions was to disclose the difference 
between uncontrolled and controlled (by governmental management) exploitation of natural 
resources and its long-term implications. He shows that under an open access fishery, the best 
harvesting grounds (represented by Farm (1) and (2) in Figure 13) attracts more fishers, and the 
average productivity equalizes across all ground in the long run. Scott (1955) extends Gordon’s 
discussion by considering the difference between short and long-term decision making by 
exploiters. Both studies stress the benefit and importance of sole ownership (entry restrictions) 
and that such arrangements yield the highest resource value. In fact, both authors argue that the 
resource rent is zero in open-access fisheries due to excess capacity and depleted stocks.  
Two decades later, Copes (1972) published a paper in which he argues that, despite the resource 
rent being zero in open-access fisheries, there can still be intra-marginal rent (quasi rent) in 
heterogenous fishing fleets. Several studies address the issue of separating intra-marginal rent 
from resource rent, see for example, Coglan and Pascoe (1999), Bjørndal et al. (2013), and 
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Jensen et al. (2019). Bjørndal et al. (2013) confirm empirically that the expected quasi rent in a 
mature and well-managed resource industry is very low. 13  
Resource rent is a common measure of profitability and efficiency in the fisheries literature. 
Numerous studies assess the issue of rent dissipation under inefficient management policies, 
i.e., they study the potential rent under optimal management, see for example, Dupont (1989), 
Weninger (1998), Homans and Wilen (2005), and Bjørndal et al. (2013). All studies find a 
significant dissipation due to sub-optimal (excess) capacity and illustrate the substantial gains 
from eliminating excess capacity and adopting the most efficient technology.  
Following the same objective, Steinshamn (2005) develops a linear programming model and 
apply this to the Norwegian fisheries. He uses data from the Directorate of Fisheries and finds 
that the current realized resource rent is one-tenth of its potential. According to Steinshamn, the 
optimal industry structure requires a reduction of input variables (fishers and vessels) by 
roughly fifty percent. Greaker et al. (2017) run the same model on newer data, and the 
conclusions are very similar to Steinshamn (2005) despite the decade that past between the 
studies. Although both papers confirm the presence of resource rent, rent realization is modest 
due to the excess capacity problem. Following an akin approach, Paulrud (2006) and Andersen 
et al. (2010) identify the same trends in Sweden and Denmark, respectively.  
Hannesson (2005) develops a radically different approach compared to the aforementioned 
papers. He investigates the resource rent by utilizing data on realized market prices of traded 
quotas in Norway. Thus, the methodology is directly dependent on the assumption of rational 
investors, and that market values truly represents the net present value of rents.  Although the 
model is novel, it produces similar results to Steinshamn (2005). However, Hannesson points 
to several limitations to his approach; for example, some investors (license owners) may assign 
quotas to an existing vessel and therefore do not account for fixed costs in auctions. Naturally, 
such cases may increase the willingness to pay for a license. On a general note, access to 
adequate data is a complicating factor for using this approach.  
Nielsen et al. (2012) investigate the development or resource rent in several fisheries in the 
Nordic countries. The authors develop a three-staged bioeconomic model and apply data from 
Norway, Sweden, Iceland, Denmark, and the Faroes Islands. The model, including all 
                                                 
13 The study finds that the intra-marginal rent accounts for two percent of the total rent (98 percent is resource 
rent) in the North Sea Herring Fishery.  
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assumptions, are similar across all nations to ensure comparability. The authors conclude in the 
same manner as most other research in the field; there is resource rent in fisheries, but there is 
an enormous potential through reducing capacity. In addition to proposing cuts in the existing 
capacity, the authors also suggest that a low rent may be due to other managerial concerns, such 
as coastal population, etc. which comes at the cost of less efficient resource utilization.  
Gunnlaugsson and Agnarsson (2019) compare two different models for measuring resource rent 
in the setting of the Icelandic fishery. One of the models, “the WACC method”, builds on the 
same principles of economic profits from the finance literature as the model I develop in chapter 
4. However, a key difference is that Gunnlaugsson and Agnarsson (2019) uses total assets, 
which also includes financial assets, as opposed to the invested capital (see chapter 4). The 
second approach is based on the return on the capital differential between the firms in fisheries 
and the average Icelandic company (estimated without fisheries). This framework implicitly 
assumes that the residual after correcting for “normal returns” (which the average company 
generates) is the resource rent. Both methods report somewhat similar results, although the 
WACC method is slightly higher on average. The authors prove that the Icelandic fishery is 
highly profitable and generates substantial resource rent.  
Thus far, I have presented selected parts of literature focusing on resource rent in the fisheries. 
Now, I turn the attention towards other natural resource industries. An example from the 
Norwegian hydropower market is the study by Amundsen and Tjøtta (1993). Hydropower has 
several similarities to aquaculture in the sense that both depend on the common property 
resource of water and designated areas. A significant bottleneck in this industry is access to 
feasible production areas, which together with production regulations (concessions) gives rise 
to considerable rent. The authors estimate an annual rent in the range of eight to fifteen NOK 
billion, depending on assumptions (e.g., the cost of capital).  
A similar study is the Banfi et al. (2005) study of rent in the Swiss hydropower industry. Based 
on a sample of sixty different production sites, the authors estimate the potential resource rent 
in case of a fundamental restructuring of the regulatory framework for hydropower firms in the 
nation. The current (in 2005) regulations are based on a fixed-fee scheme irrespective of the 
operational performance of each firm. The authors conclude that the annual resource rent is 
close to EUR 650 million, which shows potential for additional rent capture above the realized 
EUR 330 million collected from the in-place fixed-fee system.  
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Lindholt (2000) estimates the resource rent in a wide variety of resource industries in his effort 
to calculate the national wealth of Norway during 1930-1995. He applies data from the national 
accounts and evaluates the rent in forestry, fishing, hydropower, agriculture, mining, and 
petroleum. There are large differences between the various industries, and not surprisingly, 
petroleum had the largest rent with a peak of approximately NOK 80 billion in 1985 (in 1995 
NOK).14 His time series analysis clearly illustrates the importance of commodity prices on rent 
generation, for example, a supply shock triggered a fall in the petroleum rent of 75 percent from 
1985 to 1986 (Lindholt, 2000, The World Bank, 2015). 
Following a similar approach, Greaker et al. (2005) conduct an empirical analysis of the 
national wealth of Norway between 1985 to 2004. The authors present a somewhat more 
detailed picture of rent generation in various industries, including a separate account for 
aquaculture. The overall conclusions are the same as in Lindholt (2000), and the generation of 
rent is well-documented.  
The above studies show that resource industries have the potential to generate rent, and most 
studies emphasize the importance of strict regulations to preserve and maximize the resource 
value. In many cases, other managerial objectives, or simply poor management, e.g., absence 
of quotas or other forms of production regulations, suppresses the overall wealth generation 
(resource rent). As described in chapter two, the Norwegian aquaculture industry is highly 
regulated, and Norway is a considerable player on a global scale with the associated potential 
for market power. Thus, one should expect to disclose rent in the aquaculture industry.  
As mentioned, Greaker et al. (2005) investigate the development of the national wealth of 
Norway during 1985-2004, including aquaculture. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first 
empirical study to assess the rent in aquaculture explicitly. The authors conclude that the 
aquaculture industry generated positive rent in eleven out of twenty years with a peak in 2000 
of approximately NOK 4.5 billion. 15  
Flaaten and Pham (2019) analyze the resource rent in 2016 exclusively based on a sample of 
68 percent of the total farming population in Norway. They segregate the resource rent into 
scarcity rent and Ricardian rent (differential rent). The aggregate resource rent estimate totals 
NOK 15.774 billion, out of which 6.596 and 9.117 billion is SR and DR, respectively. 
                                                 
14 Approximately 125.4 billion measured in 2017 NOK 
15 Approximately 6.3 billion measured in 2017 NOK.  
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Converting the estimates to a per kilogram gutted weight equivalent basis yields NOK/GWEkg 
18.57, 7.76, and 10.81, respectively. 16 Moreover, Flaaten and Pham also utilize the Faustmann 
framework to estimate the value of a license to NOK 138 million. The authors do not make any 
attempt to isolate quasi-rents in their analysis.  
Furthermore, unpublished results by professor Mads Greaker suggests a resource rent of NOK 
27 billion in 2016 (Berglihn and Ytreberg, 2018). He derives his estimate from the national 
accounts following the same method as in Lindholt (2000), Greaker et al. (2005), Greaker et al. 
(2017), with a cost of capital of four percent. Adjusting the results of Flaaten and Pham (2019) 
to both accounting for the whole population and a cost of capital of four percent yields a 
resource rent of approximately NOK 24 billion in 2016. Although the estimates result from 
vastly different methodologies, they are clearly in the same ballpark, which adds validity to 
both estimates. Further, professor Mads Greaker together with Lars Lindholt has recently 
conducted a study of resource rents in both aquaculture and hydropower in Norway during 
1984-2018. However, only the results from hydropower are public at the time of writing this 
thesis (NOU2019:16).   
To conclude, the above review shows that well-managed resource industries have the potential 
to generate resource rent. Most papers stress the importance of strict policies and production 
regulations to ensure positive rent. In fact, most studies encourage redistribution of rights from 
less efficient producers to more efficient producers to maximize rent. The two studies focusing 
on the Norwegian aquaculture industry provides evidence of positive rent, especially the 
Flaaten and Pham (2019) study. For this reason, I should expect to find positive rent in 2016.   
Furthermore, it appears that few empirical studies to date have analyzed explicitly the rent 
shifting effects that potentially occur in fragmented value chains, i.e., most existing literature 
relies on the assumption of either complete vertical integration by the license holder or perfectly 
competitive markets in the non-licensed parts of the value chain. Situations, where these 
assumptions do not hold empirically, may produce biased results. For this reason, I now proceed 
to develop my preferred empirical approach for estimating the resource rent with an aim to 
capture potential rent shifting effects as well.  
                                                 
16 The sample contains 956,153,580 kilograms of WFE (whole fish equivalents/round weight), of which 
869,563,784 and 86,589,796 kilograms are salmon and rainbow trout, respectively. The conversion ratio from 
WFE to GWE is 0.889 for salmon and 0.881 for rainbow trout. As a result, the weight I use for the conversion is 
849,327,814 GWE-kilograms.  
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4. Methodology  
This chapter describes my empirical approach for estimating resource rent in the Norwegian 
aquaculture industry. As mentioned, resource rent is simply the economic profit from exploiting 
natural resources. For this reason, I utilize and adopt a standard definition of economic profit 
from the economic literature, such as in Berk and DeMarzo (2017). Drawing on this basic 
definition, I build a model for estimating the resource rent generated by license holders 
(farmers). Furthermore, I extend my model to also consider rent capture in other parts of the 
value chain, i.e., the model relaxes the common assumption in the existing empirical literature 
that the license holder captures the entire rent, and allows for rent shifting within the value 
chain.  
This chapter is structured as follows. First, I introduce the basic model for estimating economic 
profit, including a full introduction to all its variables and how I derive them empirically. 
Second, I explain how I extend the basic model to fit the purpose of this thesis, including how 
to capture rent shifting effects. Finally, I express the concluding model for the total resource 
rent in the Norwegian aquaculture industry.    
4.1 Economic Profit – A Standard Model 
As mentioned, economic profit represents the difference between revenue and the total costs, 
including the opportunity cost of capital, of supplying a good or service to the market. Formally, 
one can express economic profit 𝐸𝑃 in period 𝑡 as: 
 𝐸𝑃𝑡 = 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑡 − 𝐼𝐶𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 (2) 
where 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑡 represents operational earnings before interest and taxes, 𝐼𝐶𝑡̅̅ ̅̅  is the average 
invested capital during period 𝑡, and 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 is the required rate of return (before tax) on 
invested capital.  
The first term of the right-hand side (𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑡) is the accounting-based difference between 
revenue and costs, whereas the second term reflects the opportunity cost of capital. Contrary to 
Gunnlaugsson and Agnarsson (2019), I focus on operational assets only rather than total assets. 
That is, I measure the performance of core operations exclusively to avoid noise from financial 
assets. The main argument for making this distinction is that the value of exploiting natural 
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resources is, by definition, operational. As a result, the output from estimating eq. (2) measures 
the direct benefit from exploiting the natural resource in period 𝑡.  
With the basis for my empirical model in place, I now proceed to elaborate on how I compute 
each variable in eq. (2). I start by explaining EBIT and IC and conclude with the required rate 
of return (WACC).  
4.2 Operational Income and Invested Capital  
Estimating EBIT and IC of a given firm starts with the reported financial statements, which in 
its traditional form, consists of five parts and discloses key insights to the financial position of 
the entity. Part one is a profit and loss statement (revenue and costs), part two is a balance sheet 
(assets, equity, and debt), part three is a cash-flow statement, part four is a statement of changes 
in equity, and part five contains notes. The latter contributes with detailed explanations of single 
accounts (Petersen et al., 2017). As reported, financial statements do not distinguish between 
operating and non-operating assets/profits and sources of financing (Koller et al., 2015). 
Consequentially, one must reorganize the reported statements to obtain the necessary variables 
for eq. (2).  
Reorganizing financial statements starts by classifying all accounts, either as operating or non-
operating. Determining which activities to deem operating or not, relies on the business model 
and individual characteristics of the firm in question (Petersen et al., 2017). As mentioned, 
EBIT represents earnings before interest and taxes. Hence, obtaining the EBIT figure starts by 
reorganizing the profit and loss statement to disclose earnings and costs directly related to core 
operations (operational income). This implies only to consider, e.g., fish-related income for a 
fish farming firm. The concluding figure from removing all non-operational accounts equals 
the operational income (EBIT) and is compatible with eq. (2).   
With the EBIT variable in place, the next step is to reorganize the balance sheet to obtain an 
estimate of the IC. IC is the invested capital and represents the net operating assets, which are 
necessary to generate EBIT, i.e., the amount invested in operations that requires and generates 
return. Consistency is key during this process. If one includes income (operational) from an 
asset in the profit and loss statement, one must also include the asset itself (operational) in the 
balance sheet. Although most accounting items are easily categorizable, some require special 
consideration. To a large extent, I lean on recommendations set forward by Petersen et al. 
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(2017) during this part of the reorganization process. I present the most important 
considerations below.    
The first consideration regards non-recurring items, e.g., disposal of non-current assets, 
impairment losses, etc. Such items tend to represent an adaptation to new market conditions, 
restructuring, or consolidation. In a rapidly changing industry, this trend is likely to continue, 
and thus non-recurring items are mostly operational. A second consideration regards 
investments in associates and related cash flows. In most cases, such accounts are a direct 
consequence of a strategic vertical integration scheme. On this basis, I mostly include such 
arrangements in both the operational EBIT and the IC. The third consideration is with respect 
to cash. I separate cash into excess and operating according to Koller et al. (2015) with a cut-
off value of two percent of total sales in line with Opler et al. (1999). A fourth consideration 
regards non-controlling interests, which I treat as equity rather than debt. The main argument 
is the required rate of return on minority interest, which one assumes is significantly higher 
than the cost of debt. Arguably, the rent is even higher than for equity due to a potential 
illiquidity premium (Pratt, 2009). The fifth consideration regards pension obligations, which I 
treat as a financing activity. The main argument is that pension obligations are interest-bearing 
and thus receive a non-operational cash flow. A sixth consideration relates to deferred taxes. 
This accounting item does not earn interests and is therefore not a financial item. For this reason, 
I classify deferred taxes (both assets and liabilities) as operating. For a detailed discussion of 
deferred taxes, see for example, Petersen et al. (2017). The last special consideration is my 
treatment of dividends. I regard dividends as equity and, therefore part of the invested capital 
for the given year.  
When the above process is complete, one adds together equity and net-interest bearing debt 
(interest-bearing assets minus interest-bearing debt) to obtain the IC figure. The average 
invested capital (𝐼𝐶𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ) is simply the average during period 𝑡 ((𝐼𝐶𝑡 + 𝐼𝐶𝑡−1)/2).  
After completing the above procedure for each company in the data set, I form segments of 
similar companies (see below) and combine all reorganized financial statements within each 
segment to form segment-based financial records. I perform all the remaining computations 
using the segment-based accounts.   
Thus far, I have introduced 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑡 and 𝐼𝐶𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ , including how I estimate the two. Now, I turn to 
explain the required rate of return (𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶) and related parameters.  
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4.3 The Required Rate of Return  
The required rate of return on capital is an expression for the compensation a rational capital 
supplier requires to encounter risk. In this context, risk refers to a situation where future 
company cash flows may deviate negatively from the initial expectations at the time of 
supplying capital. In principle, the cost is merely a function of risk and thus often referred to as 
the opportunity cost of capital, which compares to the value a capital supplier can earn from 
alternative projects with an identical risk profile. Another term for the same cost is “discount 
rate”. This term stems from a common valuation technique called net present value estimation, 
where one discounts future cash flows with the appropriate rate to reflect risk. I use all the above 
terms interchangeably throughout the remainder of this thesis.  
In general, companies can raise funds in two ways: equity or debt. Investors supply the former, 
and creditors supply the latter. An important distinction between them is that debt has a prior 
claim on company earnings and therefore carries less risk compared to equity. Given that most 
firms have both sources of financing in their respective capital structures, one must derive a 
total cost of capital for the entity. To accommodate the differences, I calculate a weighted 
average of the capital costs with relative exposure to each source of financing as weights. This 
approach is commonly known as the weighted average cost of capital method (WACC) and is 
widely recognized in both finance and industry (European Research Group, 2007).  
Formally, one can express 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 after tax in period 𝑡 as:  
 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑎𝑥,𝑡 =  [
𝐸𝑡
𝐸𝑡 + 𝐷𝑡
] ∗ 𝑟𝐸,𝑡 + [
𝐷𝑡
𝐸𝑡 + 𝐷𝑡
] ∗ 𝑟𝐷,𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝜏𝑡) (3) 
where 𝐸𝑡 is equity, 𝐷𝑡 is net interest-bearing debt, 𝑟𝐸,𝑡 is the cost of equity, 𝑟𝐷,𝑡 is the cost of 
debt, and 𝜏𝑡 is the corporate tax rate in Norway. The specification of eq. (3) is on an after-tax 
basis but eq. (2) requires a before-tax figure. For this reason, I transform the output from eq. 
(3) by adjusting for tax effects in eq. (4).  
 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 =
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑎𝑥,𝑡
(1 − 𝜏𝑡)
 (4) 
where  𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 is the before-tax opportunity cost of capital. It follows from the specification of 
eq. (4) that I assume equal tax rates on income for both companies and private investors. This 
simplifying assumption is helpful in avoiding problems of insufficient information regarding 
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taxes paid by all stakeholders. Moreover, existing research argues that the effect of accounting 
for the different tax rates yields neglectable impacts on the overall capital cost (Johnsen, 2017). 
The output from eq. (4) represents the opportunity cost of capital and adequately accounts for 
the appropriate level of risk involved in underlying operations of the company in question. I 
now continue by explaining how to estimate the parameters in eq. (3) and (4) based on available 
information in period 𝑡.   
4.3.1 Cost of Equity  
As mentioned, investors provide equity financing, and therefore the cost of equity reflects the 
cost of capital from an investor’s perspective. A suitable framework for estimating the 
appropriate cost is the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). Despite criticisms that it is too 
simplistic (Black et al., 1972), it has been the favored method among practitioners for decades 
(Graham and Harvey, 2001). The basic idea of the model is that investors require compensation 
for risk. The risk in this model is twofold with a systematic and non-systematic (firm-specific) 
component. One assumes that all investors hold a diversified portfolio of assets (e.g., several 
stocks mixed with bonds), and thus cancel out the non-systematic constituent. For this reason, 
the cost of equity should not include any diversifiable risk (Koller et al., 2015). The degree of 
risk compensation a given investor can demand equals the difference between the expected 
return of the market and a risk-free alternative (market risk premium).   
A common expression of CAPM follows from eq. (5):  
 𝑟𝐸,𝑡 = 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 + 𝑅𝑀𝑘𝑡,𝑡 ∗ 𝛽𝐸,𝑡 (5) 
where 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 is the risk-free rate, 𝑅𝑀𝑘𝑡,𝑡 is the market risk premium (unit price of risk), and 𝛽𝐸,𝑡 is 
the equity beta and represents a coefficient for systematic risk (units of risk). For an in-depth 
explanation of the model, see for example, Fama and French (2004) or Berk and DeMarzo 
(2017). 
I use ten-year Norwegian treasury bonds (yearly average) as a proxy for the risk-free rate 
(Norges Bank, 2019) and adopt estimates of the market risk premium from existing research 
(NBIM, 2016). I calculate the equity beta based on listed seafood companies on the Oslo Stock 
Exchange, OSLSFX, with OSEBX as the benchmark index. The beta is simply the variation 
coefficient from simple statistics expressed as:  
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 𝛽𝐸,𝑡 =
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(?̃?𝐸,𝑡, ?̃?𝑀𝑘𝑡,𝑡) ∗ 𝜎?̃?𝐸,𝑡
𝜎?̃?𝑀,𝑡
 (6) 
where ?̃?𝐸,𝑡 is the equity return, ?̃?𝑀𝑘𝑡,𝑡 is the benchmark return (OSEBX), and 𝜎 is the standard 
deviation.    
I compute all estimates on a five-year rolling basis and the output from eq. (6) represents the 
equity beta of each listed company in the industry. These estimates, however, reflect the capital 
structure of each firm individually and is not directly applicable to other firms (non-listed) in 
the same industry. For this reason, I perform a de-levering procedure to disclose the systematic 
risk associated with the operational assets:   
  
𝛽𝐴,𝑡 =
𝛽𝐸,𝑡
(1 +
𝐷𝑡
𝐸𝑡
)
 
(7) 
Eq. (7) adjusts for potential differences across capital structures and reports the asset beta of 
aquaculture operations (primarily) in Norway. I then apply the asset beta to the segment-based 
cumulative statements to account for segment-specific capital structures. It is important to note 
that asset betas originate from market values, whereas the segment-based calculations use book 
values. This difference could introduce a bias to the final estimate, in the sense that it 
underestimates the beta.   
Thus far, I have presented the WACC concept and how I arrive at the cost of equity. Now I turn 
to the last component of WACC, the cost of debt.  
4.3.2 Cost of Debt 
As mentioned, debt has a priority claim on earnings and is, therefore, less risky compared to 
equity. I estimate the cost of debt simply by adding a segment-based debt premium to the risk-
free rate. The debt premium in this thesis corresponds to credit default spreads in the US bond 
market, i.e., the debt premium is the difference between a risky and a non-risky traded bond. 
To derive the appropriate premium for each segment, I assign a synthetic rating of default risk 
to each segment based on four financial ratios: interest coverage ratio, current ratio, equity 
share, and ROIC. The common denominator of all ratios is their relation to both short and long-
term ability to pay occurring expenses. For a detailed explanation of each variable, see for 
example, Petersen et al. (2017). The concluding synthetic ratio is based on a scale from triple-
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A to D, where triple-A is extremely strong and D is default. Then I translate the letter rating to 
a quantitative ratio by consulting Liu et al. (2018). 
Formally, one can express the cost of debt in period 𝑡 as:  
 𝑟𝐷,𝑡 = 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 + 𝑑𝑀𝑘𝑡 𝑡 (8) 
where 𝑑𝑀𝑘𝑡 𝑡 is the debt premium from the quantitative synthetic rating. 
This concludes my presentation of the basic model and how I estimate each variable. Now, I 
proceed to draw on the basic model to formalize my empirical approach for estimating resource 
rent in this industry.  
4.4 Resource Rent  
For this thesis, I split the resource rent term into farming rent and rent shifting. The former is 
the resource rent, as it traditionally follows from empirical research. That is, it assumes that the 
license holder captures the full rent. The rent shifting component relaxes the assumption and 
aims to correct the cost term of the farming firms to account for possible rent in other parts of 
the value chain. I start by addressing the farming rent followed by rent shifting on a per kilogram 
gutted weight basis (GWEkg), before I conclude this chapter by combining both to arrive at an 
expression for the total resource rent in the industry.   
4.4.1 Farming Rent  
This section describes my empirical approach to identify resource rent in the farming segment. 
The model draws directly on eq. (2) and extends to measure economic profit per kilogram of 
sold fish. Empirically, I analyze the resource rent based on a representative sample of the 
farming population. For this reason, I need generalizable results which scales to provide an 
estimate for the entire farming population in Norway.  
A formal expression of the model in period 𝑡 is:  
 𝑟𝑓𝑡 =
𝐸𝑃𝑓,𝑡
𝑊𝑡
𝑆  (9) 
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where 𝑟𝑓𝑡 represents resource rent in the farming segment per GWEkg, 𝐸𝑃𝑓,𝑡 is the economic 
profit in the farming segment, and 𝑊𝑡
𝑆 denotes the weight of the sold fish in the sample 
measured in GWEkg.  
Estimating eq. (9) on a representative sample produces scalable output, which is applicable for 
adjustments according to national volumes of sold fish. With that in place, I now proceed to 
extend the model to include rent shifting effects.  
4.4.2 Rent Shifting  
As detected during the literature review, the existing research on the topic of resource rent 
assumes that the license holder captures the entire rent. However, most firms rely on suppliers 
of goods and services, and thus the accounts of the license holder (farming firm) may not 
contain the actual cost of carrying the resource to the market, i.e., the difference between 
revenue and total costs in eq. (2) may not be true. As a result, I extend my model to include rent 
from all parts of the value chain by carefully analyzing potential economic profits contained in 
the reported production costs of the farming entities. My strategy to adjust costs implies 
calculating an appropriate multiplier, which accounts for and corrects for economic profit 
contained in the reported production costs. Technically, the multipliers represent a correction 
for the average economic profit percentage in each cost account of the farming firm, e.g., 
economic profit in the smolt costs, economic profit in the other operating costs, etc. I derive the 
economic profit by analyzing the financial accounts of a representative sample of supplier firms. 
Table 3 shows the working principle of my approach:  
Table 3. The working principle of the rent shifting estimation  
(A)   Production cost  As reported  
(B) - Production cost adjusted  = (A)*multiplier 
(C) = Rent shifting  = (A) – (B)  
 
As seen in table 3, the rent shifting is simply the production cost differential between (A) and 
(B) and represents the economic profit contained in a given production cost, which the farming 
entity (license holder) does not capture. That is, the cost for the farming firm is higher than the 
suppliers’ production cost (including normal profits) of the given good or service, which in turn 
introduces a negative bias to the resource rent calculated from the financial accounts of the 
farming firm (EBIT is too low).   
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In general, the established practice for reporting production costs in fish farming revolves 
around eight different cost groups: smolt, feed, assurance, personnel, depreciation, net financial 
costs, process (including transportation), and other operating costs, see for example DoF (2017) 
or Iversen et al. (2018). In line with the strategy presented above, I aim to calculate an economic 
profit percentage within each of these groups and thus rely on collecting a representative sample 
of firms within each group. Based on an in-depth analysis of the financial statements of farming 
firms in combination with a thorough review of the entire value chain, I identify segments of 
similar companies that make up the various cost groups, see table 4 (for a description of each 
segment, see chapter 5).  
Table 4. Segmented cost groups 
Cost groups as reported     Segmented cost groups  
Smolt    Smolt 
   Roe  
   Smolt  
Feed   Feed 
   Feed Producers  
    Feed Carriers  
Assurance   Assurance  
Personnel  Personnel  
Depreciation    Depreciation  
    Equipment (long-term)  
    Shipyards 
    Non-sea-based equipment  
 Other operating costs   Other operating costs  
    Cleaner fish  
    Fish health  
    Equipment (short-term)  
    Service vessels 
    Wellboats  
    Non-sea-based equipment (short-term) 
    Other services 
 Net financial costs   Net financing costs 
 Process and transportation   Process and transportation 
    Transporting (x % of wellboat cost) 
    Processing  
    Packaging 
 
The segmentation relies on a set of assumptions. First, I assume that 50 percent of equipment 
and 75 percent of non-sea-based equipment are intended for long-term usage. The numbers 
follow from a careful assessment of product portfolios of each company, in combination with 
statements from large farming firms that they expense smaller outlays and expenditures as they 
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incur (Mowi, 2018). However, I acknowledge that other analysts may arrive at slightly different 
estimates, but the distinction is important to adjust depreciation (firms capitalize long-term 
assets). Second, I assume a gradually larger share of wellboat activity over time is treatment-
related and thus belong to other operating costs rather than transportation. I set the initial share 
of wellboat activity in other operating costs to 10 percent (in 2010), which I gradually increase 
to reach 50 percent in 2017. The numbers originate from a review of treatment statistics, and 
most importantly, communication with several wellboat firms and vessel employees. If I do not 
adjust for the changed behavior of wellboat firms, I risk exaggerating the EP percentage in the 
process and transportation group.  
That said, I now proceed to express my strategy formally. I continue to utilize eq. (2), but now 
I calculate the total EP in each cost group in percent of the total revenue in the same group to 
obtain an EP percentage for cost adjustment (multiplier). The multiplier for cost group 𝑗 in 
period 𝑡 follows from eq. (10):  
 𝜋𝑗,𝑡 = 1 − [
∑ 𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑡
∑ 𝑅𝑖𝑗,𝑡
] (10) 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is the revenue in segment 𝑖 in group 𝑗 in period 𝑡. 
The above procedure applies to all cost groups except depreciation, which requires a minor 
adjustment. Depreciation is a method for allocating cost to an asset over the expected useful 
lifetime of that asset. Therefore, depreciation in period 𝑡 is not only a result of new assets in 
period 𝑡 but also all capitalized assets that are not fully depreciated before period 𝑡. It follows 
from the time notation in eq. (2), that I shall only adjust for changes in depreciation during 
period 𝑡. For this reason, I calculate the economic profit percentage in the depreciation cost 
group, but I only adjust the changes during period 𝑡. I suggest the following extension to eq. 
(10) for computing the multiplier for the depreciation cost group:    
 𝜋𝑑𝑒𝑝,𝑡 = 1 − [
𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡 − 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡−1
𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡
∗
∑ 𝐸𝑃𝑖 𝑑𝑒𝑝,𝑡
∑ 𝑅𝑖 𝑑𝑒𝑝,𝑡
] (11) 
where 𝜋𝑑𝑒𝑝,𝑡 is the multiplier for the depreciation cost group, and 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡 is the total depreciation 
cost in period 𝑡 from the financial statements of the farming firms, and the last term in the RHS 
bracket measures the economic profit percentage in the depreciation cost group. A weakness of 
eq. (11) is its dependence on three critical assumptions. First, capital expenditures are the only 
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driver of changes in depreciation, which implicitly assumes that farmers only sell outdated 
assets. Second, all investments have the same average premium. Third, all investments follow 
a linear depreciation schedule, which implies that the asset cost is equally distributed over the 
lifetime of the asset. All assumptions are strict and may not hold empirically, which introduces 
some uncertainty to the estimates. However, in the absence of significant outliers, the impact 
of depreciation costs on the total rent shifting effects have a low expected value. Hence, there 
is only a potential for modest noise inflicted upon the total resource rent estimate from these 
assumptions.  
With that in place, I apply the appropriate multiplier from eqs. (10) or (11) to the reported cost 
in the financial statements of the farming entity to obtain the adjusted cost in line with eq. (12):   
 𝐶𝑗,𝑡
𝐴 = 𝐶𝑗,𝑡
𝑅 ∗ 𝜋𝑗,𝑡 (12) 
where 𝐶𝑗,𝑡
𝐴  and 𝐶𝑗,𝑡
𝑅  is the adjusted and reported costs in cost group 𝑗 in period 𝑡, respectively. 
The estimate from eq. (12) represents the actual cost of goods and services of exploiting the 
resource, i.e., the adjusted cost is net of any rent shifting effects.  
Based on this reasoning, one can formally express the total rent shifting effects in the sample 
in period 𝑡 as:  
 𝑟𝑠𝑡 = ∑ [
(𝐶𝑗,𝑡
𝑅 − 𝐶𝑗,𝑡
𝐴 )
𝑊𝑡
𝑆 ] (13) 
where 𝑟𝑠𝑡 is the total rent shifting effects in the sample per GWEkg in period 𝑡. Figure 16. 
illustrates the estimation of rent shifting effects on a constructed example.        
Thus far, I have presented both the farming rent and rent shifting effects. Finally, I combine the 
two in one expression for the total resource rent below.   
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Figure  16. Example – Rent shifting estimation 
 
4.4.3 Total Resource Rent  
The resource rent in the Norwegian aquaculture industry in period 𝑡 follows from the combined 
expression of eq. (9) and (13), which one can define as:  
 𝑟𝑟𝑡 = 𝑓𝑟𝑡 + 𝑟𝑠𝑡 (14) 
where 𝑟𝑟𝑡 is the industry-wide resource rent per GWEkg. Under the assumption of a 
representative data set, the output from eq. (14) is scalable to account for national volumes to 
obtain the total resource rent:  
 𝑅𝑅𝑡 = 𝑟𝑟𝑡 ∗ 𝑊𝑡
𝑃 (15) 
where 𝑊𝑡
𝑃is the total weight of sold fish by the Norwegian farming population in GWEkg.  
The results from estimating eq. (15) is my aggregate estimate for the resource rent in the 
Norwegian aquaculture industry in period 𝑡. With the empirical strategy in place, I now 
continue to describe the data set to which I apply the above procedure.     
Feeding costs Other operating costs 
Reported feed costs 500 Reported other operating costs 200
- Adjusted feed costs (500*0.9) 450 - Adjusted other operating costs (200*0.8) 160
= Rent shifting total 50 = Rent shifting total 40
Rent shifting in the sample 
Rent shifting feed 50
+ Rent shifting other operating 40
/ Quantity of sold fish in sample 1 000
= Rent shifting in the sample per GWEkg 0.09
A data set contains a representative sample of all parts of the value chain. The farming firms 
in the sample report a combined feeding cost and other operating cost of 500 and 200, 
respectively. Applying eq. (10) to the feeding cost (feed carriers and producers) yields a 
multiplier of 0.9. Doing the same for the other operating cost (Wellboats, Service Vessels, Fish 
Health, and so forth) gives a multiplier of 0.8. That is, the rent shifting is 10% in the feed cost 
group and 20% in the other operating cost group. The farming companies produce (and sell) a 
combined quantity of 1000 GWE kilograms of fish. Following the above methodology results 
in a total rent shifting of 0.09 per GWE kilograms in the sample, of which 0.05 and 0.04 stem 
from feed and other operating costs, respectively. 
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5. Data  
Having established the methodology for the empirical analysis of this study, I now introduce 
the data set that will allow me to estimate the resource rent in the Norwegian aquaculture 
industry. The data set contains 745 legal entities and combines non-public material provided by 
the Directorate of Fisheries (DoF) with a vast collection of publicly available information. The 
composition of the data set is representative of the entire industry. Consequently, it 
encompasses firms from all parts of the value chain, for example, roe, smolt, farming, and 
processing.   
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I describe the process of gathering data, including the 
construction of the final data set. Then I present my data, including simple descriptive statistics 
based on revenues. Last, I address the overall representativeness of the sample.    
5.1 Data Gathering  
To ensure the reliability of my estimates, I need to construct a data set which truly represents 
the actual population. Gathering an appropriate sample is a comprehensive task and requires a 
variety of methods. The final data set consists of two main components: farming and non-
farming companies. I will now describe the sources and the construction process for each 
component sequentially.  
My primary source of information on farming firms is the annual profitability survey from the 
DoF. Attendance is mandatory for all farming companies in Norway. However, several entities 
are not present every year. There are several reasons why a firm is missing in a given year, such 
as inactivity, incomplete (or missing) submission forms, and intricate business structures17. The 
survey contains 63 variables for each observation and provides insight into production 
characteristics that are unobtainable from the financial statements and annual reports for most 
responders, for example, a detailed breakdown of quantities, inventories, costs, and sales.  
I combine the survey data with complete financial statements on all firms in the DoF data set 
obtained from the Brønnøysund Register Centre (BRC).  
                                                 
17 Some farming groups report difficulties in isolating the farming business from other activities.  
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The second component of my data set contains information on non-farming companies. To the 
best of my knowledge, there are no official data sets on suppliers of goods and services within 
the aquaculture industry. Hence, identifying relevant players is considerably more complex in 
this case compared to the farming case.  
I initiate my scout for non-farming firms by searching through standardized categories, or 
codes, used for industrial classification in Norway (SSB, 2008). Each category consists of a 
short description of its content and a unique code. Then I employ the relevant codes to the 
Central Coordinating Register for Legal Entities in Norway to recognize individual firms within 
each category. Also, I collect and utilize historical exhibitor lists from exhibitions, such as 
Aqua-Nor, Nor-Fishing, and LofotFishing. The former is the world’s largest technology 
exhibition for the seafood industry according to the organizer (Aqua Nor, 2019). Further, I 
supplement with companies identified through complete supplier lists from two large farming 
groups. And finally, I rely on extensive web browsing. Appendix 1 reports all industrial codes 
represented in the final data set.   
Following the identification process, I consult BRC for complete financial statements for each 
firm. I exclude companies if they meet one or more of the following criteria: it has less than 
two years of reported revenue, it has less than one employee, and it has zero capitalized assets. 
Furthermore, I also exclude companies where aquaculture is not an important business area 
with respect to total sales, where I base the assessment of importance on information from 
annual reports, communication with the firms in question, and web browsing. A guiding 
principle is that aquaculture should account for at least half of total sales in all firms. Lastly, I 
only include first-order supplier firms, that is, firms that provide goods or services directly to 
the farming firm.  The final sample holds 616 non-farming entities with a total of 4032 fiscal 
years over the sample period, 2010-2017.  
The concluding step of the data set construction phase is to study and understand the operations 
of each company to cluster units with similar core activities. This is the mentioned 
segmentation, which is essential for the methodology, as described in chapter four.  
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5.2 Segmentation  
Table 5 depicts the fifteen different segments that I define and use in my analysis. As 
mentioned, I chose segments based on an in-depth analysis of the financial statements of 
farming firms in combination with a thorough review of the entire value chain. The observant 
reader will notice that I do not include sales and marketing, neither as a segment nor in the data 
set altogether. I exclude this final step of the value chain because of insufficient information 
regarding quantities sold in each company. Moreover, sales entities tend to have low IC, and 
ROIC may thus not be a suitable measure of historical performance.  
By omitting the final stage of the value chain, I risk the possibility of miscalculating the RR. 
However, according to my calculations and several publications by EY (2016, 2017, 2018), the 
sales segment has an overall low-margin tendency, which by definition, restricts the possibility 
of significant rent generation. Based on the preceding arguments, I assume arm’s length 
pricing18 of all trades between farming and sales affiliates, i.e., the farming division is de facto 
capturing most of the rent from fish sales. Considering this assumption, I expect the farming 
segment to hold most of the rent from sales.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 The arm’s length principle states that the price paid between related parties must be the same as if the parties 
were unrelated.  
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Table 5. Segments and descriptions 
Segment Description 
Farming  Firms are producing the fish commodity (license holders).   
Roe  Providers of genetic material (salmon and trout eggs).  
Smolt Spawning and smoltification firms.   
Wellboats Providers of wellboat services, such as transportation and treatment of livestock.  
Service Vessels Firms typically operate heavy-duty catamarans intended for treatments, mooring 
work, fish delivery, inspections, and so forth. The segment also includes diving, 
net-cleaning, and treatment* firms.  
Feed Producers Providers of fish feed pellets. The segment does not include ingredient 
companies, e.g., fishmeal and fish oil.  
Feed Carriers  Providers of feed pellet transportation at sea.  
Cleaner Fish  Firms engaged in farming or catching cleaner fish.  
Equipment  Providers of equipment for the sea-based production phase. 
Processing  The segment includes both primary (slaughter and whole fish) and secondary 
processing (VAP) firms. 
  
Packaging  Providers of plastic, paper, labeling solutions, and Styrofoam.  
Fish Health  Firms related to all aspects of fish health, e.g., laboratories and veterinarians. 
The segment also includes medical firms providing various remedies, for 
example, vaccines, disinfectants, and specialized medical feed.     
Non-Sea-Based 
(NSB) Equipment  
Providers of equipment intended for all onshore stages of the production cycle, 
e.g., slaughtering and packaging machines, conveyor belts, and smolt tanks.  
Shipyards Firms engaged in the production of wellboats, service vessels, feed transporters, 
and personnel transportation vessels.  
Other Services  All other firms that do not fit into the above categories but are essential for the 
value chain. Ranging from electricians to certification companies.  
  *This is companies owning and operating large ships, or barges, exclusively intended for treatments (e.g., Thermolicer, 
Hydrolicer, Skamik, and Optilicer). 
Thus far, I have described the data gathering, data set construction, and the segmentation 
process. In the following section, I present key characteristics and the summarized statistics of 
the data set.  
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5.3 Data set Characteristics  
The final data set is unbalanced, which implies that the number of fiscal years is less than the 
full period (2010-2017) for some units. Mergers, acquisitions, and restructuring are the most 
prominent explanations for the imbalance. Table 6 reports simple summary statistics based on 
revenues during 2010-2017.   
Table 6. Summary statistics of annual revenues by segment in NOK thousands. 
    
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Units N Average Median Aggregate (2010-17) 
Farming 129 720 362 565 161 673 255 899 325 
Roe 12 78 80 356 34 276 6 267 741 
Smolt 90 633 26 949 16 068 17 058 811 
Wellboats 29 182 75 395 19 899 13 721 859 
Service Vessels 89 443 22 050 12 282 9 768 309 
Feed Producers 10 67 2 047 999 208 570 137 215 966 
Feed Carriers 10 80 67 951 49 323 5 436 065 
Cleaner Fish 25 151 10 840 3 183 1 636 883 
Equipment 106 713 79 702 36 576 56 827 263 
Processing 60 424 192 611 45 049 81 667 089 
Packaging 9 65 141 908 58 019 9 224 045 
Fish Health  38 268 91 904 13 138 24 630 200 
NSB Equipment 73 524 97 843 35 278 51 269 906 
Shipyards 22 146 88 672 25 982 12 946 179 
Other Services 43 258 38 009 4 552 9 806 229 
Total 745 4 752   693 375 870 
Notes: Units is the number of individual legal entities. N is the number of observations (firm-years), floating prices.    
Column (1) reports the number of individual entities in the data set. Column (2) shows the 
number of fiscal years (observations). The imbalance is evident since Column (1) multiplied 
with 8 (number of years during 2010-2017) is different from column (2) in most cases. Columns 
(3) and (4) report the average and median revenue in each segment across all years. Finally, 
column (5) displays the aggregate revenue over the entire period.  
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To summarize, the data set contains 745 individual legal entities with a total of 4,752 firm-year 
observations with an accumulated revenue of NOK 693.4 billion. I now finalize this chapter by 
evaluating the representativity of the data to secure the validity of my empirical estimates.   
5.4 Representativeness of the Sample  
This section follows the same structural layout as above; I start with the farming component 
before I move on to the non-farming component. Assessing the representativeness of the 
farming data is less complicated compared to the non-farming data since the true population 
capacity parameter in the former is known. 19 Table 7 reports the sample (S) relative to the 
population (P), with respect to licenses and sales.   
Table 7. Representativeness of the farming sample 
Variable  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
#Companies (S) 101 92 94 91 88 88 84 82 
#Licenses (S) 670 657 634 688 685 683 743 683 
#Licenses (P) 974 998 996 1 011 1 009 1 059 1 088 1 093 
#Licenses (S in % of P) 69  66  64  68  68  64  68  62  
Sales in GWEt (S)* 628 684 751 820 824 846 849 805 
Sales in GWEt (P)* 883 998 1 161 1 102 1 179 1 223 1 174 1 158 
Sales in GWEt (S in % of P) 71  69  65  74  70  69 72  70  
Notes: # represents “number of”. *numbers in thousands  
Source: DoF (2018a), DoF (2019b), SSB (2019) 
The first row of Table 7 shows the number of companies in the sampling year. The second row 
reports the number of licenses controlled by firms in the sample, and the third row reports the 
number of licenses in the population. The fourth row calculates the magnitude of the sample 
relative to the population. The fifth and sixth row reports sales in gutted weight for the sample 
and population, respectively. The seventh and final row calculates the sample sales relative to 
the population sales. As the table shows, the sample represents between 62 and 69 percent of 
all licenses and between 65 and 74 percent of the total Norwegian supply during the period.  
As seen above, the sample consistently covers about two-thirds of the underlying farming 
population regarding the number of licenses and sales volume, which could suggest that the 
                                                 
19 The DoF records all farming companies and associated capacity in the aquaculture register.  
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sample is representative. However, a relatively large share of the population is not necessarily 
a guarantee for representativity since it could contain, e.g., only the most profitable firms for 
some reason. Thus, to assess the representativity of the sample, one must consider the selection 
criteria and deem whether they are likely to omit important observations. As mentioned, the 
most prominent reasons the DoF excludes firms from their survey data set are incomplete (or 
missing) submission forms, intricate business structures, inactivity, and other unspecified 
reasons. 
Considering the mandatory attendance in the survey, one may find it reasonable to expect the 
DoF to pursue companies that systematically fail to submit satisfactory submission forms or 
firms that consistently refrain from participating. Hence, one should expect that the composition 
of omitted firms according to the first criterion changes over time, and therefore it does not 
make the sample any less representative on average. The second criterion implies that certain 
companies have difficulties in separating farming operations from other activities, which could 
introduce a bias to the sample by only including well-defined companies. The third criterion 
omits inactive companies and does not introduce any bias. In fact, by failing to exclude inactive 
companies, one risks to, e.g., underestimate the return on invested capital by exaggerating the 
total invested capital that is involved in generating profits.20 The last and final criterion is 
diffuse, and the DoF does not disclose any information about what it includes. On average, 
“other reasons” accounts for about 17 percent of all omitted observations and most certainly 
have the potential to bias the sample. 
To assess the overall omitted observation bias, I run cross-checks against the aquaculture 
register combined with data from the Norwegian Food Safety Authority (lice register). 
According to my analysis, the DoF survey systematically omits certain firms that in total 
accounts for between 20 and 30 percent of the population in terms of licenses.21 Unfortunately, 
I do not have sufficiently detailed information on these companies to include them in my 
resource rent analysis.22 However, I do have enough information to calculate various financial 
ratios, which clearly shows that the profitability is in line with the results based on the sample 
firms.  
                                                 
20 All else equal, by increasing the invested capital one effectively decreases the EP in eq. (2).  
21 The identity of companies in the survey is classified information based on a legal agreement with the DoF. For 
this reason, I cannot disclose the names of omitted firms either.  
22 I do not have access to detailed production data on these observations, e.g., kilograms produced or sold, 
specific revenue from sale of fish, etc.   
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Adding to the points made above, the sample shows great diversity and includes companies 
from all over the coast, and in all sizes. Altogether, the DoF survey seems to be representative 
of the population, and none of the exclusion criteria seem to introduce significant noise to the 
sample during the period 2010 to 2017. 
The representativeness of the non-farming data is harder to assess since there is no official 
register of the actual population. However, Sintef, one of Europe’s largest independent research 
organizations, published a study on the ripple effects from the aquaculture and fishery supplier 
industries in 2017 (Winther et al., 2017), that I can use as a reference point. In this study, the 
authors describe a somewhat similar data gathering strategy, and the result is a data set with 
830 firms. The inclusion of fisheries is an important distinction, and I expect their database to 
contain more companies. The most apparent explanation is that first-order suppliers to the 
fisheries are often second-order suppliers to the aquaculture industry, e.g., echo sounding and 
navigation systems, cranes, and winches. I do not include second-order suppliers in my data 
set, thus reducing the sample size significantly. Under the assumption that a data set with 830 
firms is representative for the population of firms in two industries, I find it reasonable to 
assume that my sample, which only includes aquaculture, is representative with its 616 firms 
(745 including farming).  
To further support my assumption, I compare my assessment of the historical performance of 
each segment (appendix 2) with the findings in the annual aquaculture analysis report by EY 
(2016, 2017, 2018). The similarities are striking regarding aggregate revenue in the sample, i.e., 
my sample corresponds to the one Ernst & Young uses for inference. 
Altogether, the data gathering approach of non-farming companies seems to be appropriate for 
identifying industry players, and the sample appears equally representative as the data used in 
existing research. That said, by applying various selection criteria, such as only considering 
legal entities, I risk to omit players that are essential for daily farming operations, e.g., the local 
electricians, plumbers, carpenters, drivers, etc. that often follow a Norwegian legal form called 
“ansvarlig selskap” (liable company) where financial information is not publicly available. 
Furthermore, by excluding companies with less than two years of reported revenue, I risk 
excluding players that are involved in restructuring processes in addition to start-up companies 
that are essential for driving innovation. Contrary, by omitting firms without capitalized assets 
and only include companies where aquaculture is a significant business area, I ensure to 
incorporate companies that are actively involved in the aquaculture industry and have a real 
57 
 
potential to capture rent. All the above arguments taken together, I find it reasonable to assume 
that the non-farming data is representative and will secure the reliability of my empirical results.  
The final contribution of this subchapter is an assessment of the physical whereabouts of the 
entire sample (both farming and non-farming companies) to ensure geographical diversity. 
Figure 17 depicts the distribution of companies in the data set based on the legal address of the 
headquarter (HQ) on a municipality-basis. The sample includes approximately 45 percent of all 
municipalities (190 of 422)  and 100 percent of all counties (18 of 18). The top five most 
important counties based on the number of registered entities are Hordaland (20.42 percent), 
Trøndelag (15.52 percent), Møre og Romsdal (15.24 percent), Nordland (13.99 percent), and 
Sogn og Fjordane (7.69 percent). The top five most prominent municipalities are Bergen (5.04 
percent), Frøya (3.34 percent), Vikna (3.22 percent), Austevoll (3.22 percent), and Trondheim 
(2.94 percent). Although the location of the HQ does not necessarily represent the actual activity 
in each geographic area, the data set seems to be diverse and encompasses firms from most 
parts of the nation, which further strengthens the overall validity of the data. 
Altogether, I take the above arguments, reference studies, and analysis as evidence in favor of 
the representativeness of the data set. This concludes my presentation of the data, and I now 
proceed to the empirical analysis, where I utilize the sample to estimate the resource rent, 
including rent shifting, in the industry.  
Figure  17. Geographical distribution of the data set – municipalities  
 
 
Notes: The map highlights all municipalities represented in the data set.   
Source: BRC (2019), Author  
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6. Empirical Analysis 
In this chapter, I report and discuss results from applying eqs. (9), (13), (14), and (15) to my 
data set. Followed by robustness tests of critical parameters that intend to elucidate the 
sensitivity of the results to changes in key parameters that cannot be measured with certainty 
by recalculating outcomes under alternative assumptions. The objective of my analysis is to 
report a reliable estimate range for the resource rent in the Norwegian aquaculture industry.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I present my estimate of the farming rent, followed by 
the rent shifting effects. Second, I provide estimates of the total resource rent in the industry for 
each period. Finally, I assess the uncertainty of the estimates through a sensitivity analysis, 
which contributes with an upper and lower bound to my concluding resource rent figures. For 
detailed information on all input variables used in this analysis, see appendix 2.  
6.1 Resource Rent in Farming – Baseline Results  
Table 8 reports the estimated rent when applying my data set, described in chapter five, to eq. 
(9). The realized resource rent in the farming segment is positive for all years except 2012, with 
a notable positive deviation in the two later years. In fact, the rent nearly tripled in 2016 
compared to the previous year, followed by a minor correction of minus ten percent in 2017. 
For these two later years, the rent spiked due to high prices for the underlying commodity. 
Contrary, the negative rent in 2012 was a result of plummeting prices as a direct consequence 
of a Chilean volume rebound from the mentioned negative supply shock in 2009. Farmers make 
production decisions (volumes) three years prior to harvest, and thus face significant 
uncertainty concerning future prices. The high prices in 2009 and 2010 gave an incentive to 
produce (and sell) as much fish as possible. When the Chilean production volumes normalized 
in late 2011, it implied a short-term over-supply in the market that pushed prices down and 
seemingly below the breakeven levels of Norwegian farmers, i.e., the cost of exploiting the 
resource exceeded the benefit. Although one could argue that negative rents are a sign of 
inefficient extraction since the return to the resource is lower than the input, the production 
levels were rational (and efficient) at the time of decision (in 2009). If the resource rent remains 
negative for a sustained period, it may indicate inefficient exploitation, and the invisible hand 
of the market will make necessary adjustments, e.g., adjusting production levels, bankruptcies 
with associated redistribution of licenses from the least efficient to the more efficient players, 
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etc. For this reason, one must consider extraction strategies on a long-term basis, as Figure 18 
clearly illustrates.  
Table 8. Resource rent in the farming segment 
Notes: All numbers are in NOK/kg and floating prices 
Source: Author 
When using resource rents as a measure of national wealth, researchers often replace negative 
values with non-negative values (zero), based on the argument that the management of the 
resources had other objectives or goals than maximizing the rent, e.g., coastal population 
(Lindholt, 2000). In Norway, the license holders are strongly encouraged to ensure local jobs 
along the coast and actively prevent depopulation (Ministry of Trade Industry and Fisheries, 
2005). Thus, one can expect farming firms to operate with somewhat undesirable company 
structures, though to a minor extent, and consequently have a higher than necessary production 
costs at the expense of lower resource utilization.   
Figure  18. The spot price of salmon and production costs, floating prices. 
 
Source: NASDAQ (2019), DoF (2018a), Norsk Standard (2012), Author  
Note: The production cost includes: smolt, feed, personnel, depreciation, net financial expenses, insurance, processing and 
transportation, and other operating costs. The production cost does not account for the opportunity cost of capital.    
 
 
Variable 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
𝑟𝑓𝑡  8.64 1.99 -1.25 6.97 6.22 5.02 18.50 16.81 
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The only empirical analysis available for comparison with Table 8 is the Flaaten and Pham 
(2019) study. As mentioned, they estimate a resource rent of NOK 15.774 billion, or NOK 
18.57 per GWEkg, based on a sample of 68 percent of the farming population. Although the 
authors apply a different approach, the estimates seem to coincide very well with mine. Further, 
Flaaten and Pham (2019) also calculate the value of a license to NOK 138 million, or NOK 176 
thousand per tonne of licensed capacity, in 2016. I compute a comparable figure of NOK 139.9 
million, or NOK 179.4 thousand per tonne of licensed capacity, in 2017 (see Appendix 3). 
Finally, the license value from my analysis is very close to the average price of NOK 195 
thousand per tonne of licensed capacity, paid at the 2018 auction (DoF, 2018). The fact that 
both license value estimates seem to be in the ballpark of the realized price in the most recent 
auction indicates that farmers are acting rationally. 
It follows from economic theory that an investor (farmer) should only accept positive net 
present value investments. If this does not hold, then the value-added (or real growth) from the 
investment is less than or equal to zero. For this reason, the rational investor is willing to pay 
exactly the expected economic profit (resource rent) from the license to participate in the 
market. My analysis and the realized prices at the 2018 auction show that the farming firms are 
willing to pay the full benefit from new capacity in advance.23 I regard this behavior as strong 
evidence in favor of extensive resource rent in the industry, and farmers clearly acknowledge 
the benefit of having privileged access to common property rights.  
Altogether, the analysis suggests significant resource rent in the farming segment, although 
with great volatility. The two later years of the study have proven particularly lucrative because 
of soaring fish prices. I now proceed to investigate potential rent shifting effects by addressing 
the possibility of rent capture in other parts of the value chain. 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 Which is equivalent to paying 100% resource rent tax.  
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6.2 Rent Shifting Effects – Baseline Results  
Table 9 reports the estimated rent shifting from applying my data set to eq. (13). Although 
several cost groups report negative effects, the aggregate effect is positive for all years during 
the period. The table discloses multiple notable developments. First, the shifting effects vary 
substantially between various cost groups, with the most significant variation in feed and other 
operating costs. Second, depreciation and other operating costs are the only groups that remain 
positive throughout the entire period. Third, the most prominent contributor to rent shifting in 
2010 reports a strongly negative effect in 2017. Fourth, other operating costs is the largest 
yearly contributor in six out of eight years. In addition, other operating costs are, on average, 
substantially larger than any other cost group.  
Table 9. Rent shifting effects 
Cost variable 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Average 
(2010-17) 
Smolt 0.03 0.08 0.03 -0.07 0.02 -0.01 0.11 -0.19 0.00 
Feed 0.42 0.17 0.29 -0.08 -0.27 0.01 0.28 -0.19 0.08 
Depreciation 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Other operating  0.17 0.21 0.19 0.30 0.44 0.58 0.76 0.41 0.38 
Process & 
Transportation 
-0.04 0.03 0.03 -0.04 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.03 
 𝑟𝑠𝑡 0.58 0.50 0.54 0.13 0.24 0.67 1.22 0.09 0.50 
Notes: All numbers are in NOK/GWEkg and floating prices   
Source: Author 
The findings in Table 9 suggest that other parts of the value chain capture parts of the resource 
rent. As a result, assessing the resource rent in the industry solely based on the farming segment 
introduces a bias to the conclusion.  
As mentioned, according to economic theory, one would expect that positive economic profits 
encourage entry to the industry (or segment). In the case of the farming segment, entry is not 
possible, and therefore positive profits can also persist in the long run. In the remaining parts 
of the value chain, however, there are few barriers to entry and economic profits should revert 
to zero over time. The reversion time depends on at least three factors. First, how quickly 
existing players can adjust supply to account for changes in demand. Second, how rapidly 
potential newcomers can establish a competing firm and at which cost. Last, the managerial 
practices in farming firms, e.g., contract lengths, cost management focus, quality preferences, 
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personal relationships, etc. The sum of these factors determines the bargaining power of 
suppliers, which drives the rent shifting effects. In the remainder of this subchapter, I attempt 
to highlight these effects by narrowing in on the two most significant cost groups, namely feed 
and other operating costs.  
Under the assumption that all players are rational and thus continuously seek to maximize 
profits, one should expect to find most explanatory variables for positive rent shifting in 
fundamental conditions, e.g., exogenous supply or demand shocks. The feed cost group consists 
of two segments, namely feed carriers and feed producers. Table 10 shows an outtake from the 
analysis in appendix 2, where the return on invested capital (ROIC) is a measure of the realized 
return on invested capital.  
Table 10. Profitability in the Feed cost group 2010-2017 
Segment  Variable 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
F. Producers 
ROIC (%) 22.02 16.05 17.94 9.98 6.27 9.46 15.06 5.66 
WACC (%) 10.76 10.94 10.03 11.30 11.38 8.85 7.85 8.84 
F. Carriers 
ROIC (%) 7.65 7.70 8.02 9.68 6.93 8.42 6.47 7.01 
WACC (%) 12.03 12.24 12.56 11.87 11.38 9.96 9.79 10.12 
Notes: Return on invested capital (ROIC) is defined as ROIC = EBIT/(Yearly average IC). One can interpret a ROIC of 22% 
as earning 0.22 NOK per 1 NOK invested in operations.   
Source: Author  
 
As seen in table 10, the feed carriers have yet to contribute positively to rent shifting.24 
Consequentially, any positive rent shifting effects must originate from feed production. The 
primary reasons for the low margins in the feed carrier segments are mostly low tonnage 
utilization combined with long freight distances and expensive vessels (invested capital relative 
to income potential). The first two reasons stem from the fact that (until recently) each vessel 
only carries feed from one specific producer, while one farming firm may order feed from 
several producers to neighboring production sites. Whereas modernization, e.g., silo-based 
cargo systems with automated offloading systems as opposed to carrying feeding bags and 
offloading by diggers/cranes, implementation of dynamic positioning when offloading as 
opposed to tying the ship to a feed barge, etc. explain the latter (NSK Shipping AS, 2019, Egil 
Ulvan Rederi AS, 2019). For these reasons, the industry does not encourage entry and existing 
players are currently adjusting supply through consolidation and restructuring (e.g., carrying 
                                                 
24 ROIC is consistently lower than WACC (realized return is lower than required) 
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feed for more than one producer at once (Brundtland, 2019)), i.e., the market is currently 
adjusting to reach equilibrium and thus revert rents from negative to zero.  
The feed producer segment was, for a long time, an established oligopoly consisting of three 
large suppliers: Skretting, Biomar, and Ewos. In aggregate, the demand for pellets is a function 
of licensed capacity and its utilization (the average standing biomass). As a result, the 
established produces only have incentives to make incremental capacity investments, unless 
new investments can substantially change production costs and in turn, increase market shares 
of the producers. For this reason, entry to this market is very expensive because new entrants 
must be able to produce substantial quantities at lower prices than established firms to acquire 
market shares. That said, the market suffered an exogenous supply shock in 2012 that rocked 
the market. Mowi, the world’s largest salmon producer, proclaimed its strategy to become feed 
self-sufficient within 2014 (Mowi ASA, 2012). Following the announcement, established feed 
producers faced significant overcapacity and lower utilization from 2014 and onwards. The 
announcement materialized in substantial downward pressure on margins, especially on 
homogenous products (“regular” pellets). Adding to the weakened bargaining power was also 
the low salmon price in 2012, which possibly triggered intensified cost management focus in 
the farming firms. The events in 2012 are observable in Table 9, where the average rent shifting 
of feed is NOK/GWEkg 0.29 during 2010-2012, and NOK/GWEkg -0.08 during 2013-2017. 
From 2014 onwards, the profits in feed production are possibly approaching equilibrium (P = 
MC) on regular pellets, and most value-added (rent) stems from heterogeneous products, 
particularly in times of challenging biological farming conditions, e.g., as seen in 2015/2016. 
Figure 19 depicts Mowi’s impact on the respective market shares.  
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Figure  19. Market shares in the Norwegian fish feed market 
 
 
Notes: Market shares are based on revenues and not quantities due to confidentiality considerations.  
Source: BRC (2019), DoF (2019b)   
To summarize, the feed market has changed drastically during the period, and the present 
market is characterized by fierce competition with associated margin pressure. Thus, one should 
only expect modest rent shifting effects going forward, primarily driven by heterogeneous 
products, such as specialized growth feed, medical feed, etc., which carries a potential for price 
premiums. That said, the future may hold new shocks with associated elevated rent shifting, for 
example, form increased feed demand related to land-based and offshore farming technologies.  
Clearly, there have been significant exogenous shocks in the feed market historically, and the 
shifting effects seem to behave according to economic theory by reverting towards zero. Now, 
I turn the attention towards other operating costs to see if the same mechanisms apply.    
The other operating cost group consists of seven segments, Cleaner Fish, Fish Health, 
Equipment, Non-sea-based Equipment, Service Vessels, Wellboats, and Other Services. Figure 
20 depicts the contribution from each segment to the total rent shifting effect in the other 
operating cost group during 2010-2017. The figure shows that five out of seven segments peak 
in 2016, and six out of seven reverts in 2017. 
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Figure  20. Rent-shifting effects: Other operating costs by segment 
 
Notes: Floating prices. Shows segment-based contribution to the other operating cost group rent shifting effects. 
Source: Author  
Considering the coordinated behavior among most of the segments, one should expect to find 
at least some common denominators across the fields. Analyzing the financial records of 
farming firms reveals that farmers post most of the treatment-related costs as other operating. 
Thus, a sensible point of departure for understanding the shifting effects is to consult treatment 
data. Figure 21 depicts the average number of lice per fish, together with the number of weekly 
treatments against lice on a national level during 2010-2017. Treatments include bath, 
mechanical, and medical feed (slice). The data shows that, on average, 2016 was the busiest 
year with respect to number of treatments. In fact, the number of treatments was 26 percent 
higher in 2016 compared to 2015, thus facilitating higher demand for lice-related goods and 
services. Increased demand, all else equal, improves the bargaining power of suppliers and one 
expects to see higher prices in the short-run. This mechanism coincides well with the rent 
shifting effects in Figure 20. However, Figure 20 also provides evidence of adaptation to 
increased demand, which materializes in a strong reversion effect in 2017.   
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Figure  21. Average lice levels and number of treatments in Norway during 2010-2017. 
 
Notes: Number of actions includes treatments (mechanical and bath), slice, and the number of cleaner fish releases. 
Source: Mattilsynet (2019a) 
The duration of positive profits depends on how rapid the supply side manages to establish a 
new equilibrium, i.e., how quickly existing, or aspiring, firms can increase supply to match a 
higher demand. In the fish health segment, building capacity depends on the service or good in 
question. It takes several years to educate new veterinarians (or fish health biologists), and even 
longer to develop and receive approval for new remedies. Further, several firms may even hold 
important patents, which allow for positive profits over a prolonged period. However, Figure 
20 shows a gradual improvement of the rent shifting effects from 2012 to 2016 before a strong 
reversion in 2017. This development suggests that it takes time to build capacity in this field, 
but it may be approaching demand in 2017.    
Continuing the analysis by studying service vessels shows a similar trend. Adjusting supply in 
the service market depends on how long it takes to build a new vessel, which for most vessels 
are from four months to a year. The economic profits of the Service Vessel segment are positive 
for all years during 2010-2017. A major explanation for the sustained profits is the introduction 
of mechanical delousing techniques such as Thermolicer, Skamik, Optilicer, and Hydrolicer. A 
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typical mechanical treatment requires a treatment vessel (e.g., a wellboat, barge, or designated 
ship) in addition to 1-3 service vessels, which is significantly more than a comparable bath 
treatment where farmers often use one service vessel and 2-3 small boats equipped with 
capstans25. Figure 22 shows the transition from bath to mechanical treatment methods, and it 
seems to coincide with the rent shifting effects.  
Figure  22. The transition from bath to mechanical treatment methods 
Notes: The figure shows the total number of weekly bath and mechanical treatments from 2012 to 2019.    
Source: Mattilsynet (2019a) 
Moreover, adding to the points made above is also other exogenous shocks to the demand side 
such as a greater need for mooring work and inspections due to tightened regulations.  
Leaning on economic theory, one should expect to see an increase in both new entrants (new 
players) and new vessels from existing firms. The empirical evidence confirms substantial 
supply-side activity. In 2010, the number of vessels in my sample is 94 compared to 248 in 
2017, and 59 percent of the new supply entered during 2015-2017 (92 vessels). In addition, 
there is also a shift in behavior over the period. During 2010-2014, 16 percent of new builds 
was above fifteen meters of length, whereas 39 percent of all new builds are above 15 meters 
                                                 
25 A capstan is a deck equipment used to pull ropes with tension between 1-3 tonnes (normally).  
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of length during 2015-2017.26 There is strong evidence that the supply side is adjusting, and 
future rent-shifting effects should revert even further as supply approaches demand.  
The wellboat segment also benefits from increased demand from treatments. Many wellboat 
firms install mechanical delousing machines on their ships in addition to treating lice with fresh 
water in the freight tanks (wells). In contrast to the service vessel segment, the number of 
wellboats remains stable during the period. Table 11 shows the capacity of the standing 
Norwegian wellboat fleet during 2010-2017.  
Table 11. The estimated capacity of the Norwegian wellboat fleet during 2010-2017 
Year 
Average Well-
Capacity (m3) 
Average Gross 
Tonnage 
Number of 
Ships 
2010 946 893 62 
2011 957 912 58 
2012 980 937 60 
2013 1 095 1 051 56 
2014 1 184 1 151 58 
2015 1 252 1 232 58 
2016 1 392 1 399 60 
2017 1 689 1 768 66 
CAGR (%) 9 10 1  
Growth (%) 78 98 6 
 
Notes: Based on a sample of approximately one hundred new builds during 1996-2018.  
Source: Aas Mek Verksted AS (2019), DoF (2019b), Mattilsynet (2019b), NIS (2019), NOR (2019), Refvik (2005-2019) 
 
The large growth in well-capacity shows how the supply side is adjusting to increased demand. 
However, by refraining from increasing the number of ships, the industry manages to sustain a 
certain level of bargaining power since one ship can only be on one locality at once. Further, 
farming firms tend to charter vessels on semi-long contracts (often two years), which predefine 
prices over the entire period. That said, farmers also hire substantial capacity through the spot 
market in times of tough biological conditions. Besides, one may also speculate that running a 
wellboat company relies on established relationships and trust, given the large values they carry 
                                                 
26 15 meters is a threshold for ship classification, where above 15 meters requires, e.g., certificates of 
competence, a minimum crew of three people (normally), more safety equipment, stricter reporting standards, 
etc.  
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on behalf of farmers. As a result, wellboats may have lower price sensitivity than other 
segments.  
Although table 11 shows that the number of vessels remains stable over the period, there is now 
significant ship-building activity among farmers. This could be an effort to reduce margins, or 
simply because they use wellboats to such extent that it is reasonable to have their own. 
Furthermore, there is also an increasing interest in processing vessels, which naturally can carry 
significantly higher fish volumes per gross tonnage of ship size. Altogether, the wellboat 
segment will most likely experience a significant supply increase in the number of vessels going 
forward, which carries the potential to reduce the existing bargaining power from relatively few 
vessels in operation.      
The cleaner fish segment is a rather new constituent to the professional supplier industry. 
Historically, local fishers around the coast caught wild living cleaner fish as a side-job during 
the summer months and sold it to farmers. In recent history, however, the segment has changed 
drastically. Today, more than fifty percent of the cleaner fish in Norwegian pens stems from 
systematical farming in sizable onshore factories (DoF, 2019b). Figure 23 depicts the 
introduction of farmed cleaner fish in 2012-2013.  
Figure  23. Cleaner fish usage during 2010-2017 
 
Notes: Shows the number of cleaner fish released and the associated value during 2010-2017 (floating prices) 
Sources: DoF (2019b) 
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During the period of interest, the volume has increased by nearly 400 percent, with a growth in 
value per fish of 133 percent in nominal terms. Implicitly, there has been a remarkable latent 
demand for cleaner fish in recent years. A possible explanation is that cleaner fish is the most 
effective preventive tool in the battle against lice. Using more cleaner fish implies (normally) 
fewer treatments, which often carries considerable mortality (Hjeltnes et al., 2019). Ever since 
2014, the cleaner fish firms have captured rent through strong bargaining power. According to 
economic theory, this should attract new entrants, which it has. In 2012, there were five 
companies with a total of 15 licenses, compared to 27 companies and 45 licenses in 2017 (DoF, 
2019a). Despite the drastic increase, there are no signs of downward pressure on margins in the 
segment yet (appendix 2). However, one should expect to see intense establishment activity 
going forward, and margins will come down as producers satisfy demand and start competing 
on price.  
That said, one could speculate if the authorities will dampen the growth in capacity due to health 
problems in the cleaner fish factories with alarming growth in antibiotics consumption (Grave 
and Helgesen, 2018). This trend could define barriers to entry in line with those in salmon and 
trout farming until the industry develops better technology, gains knowledge, and improves 
procedures. Another potential threat to future growth is increased focus on animal welfare for 
the cleaner fish, which under the present farming regime is poor (Hjeltnes et al., 2019). This 
latter factor could contribute to lower demand, which will impose downward pressure on 
margins (and thus reduce rent shifting).      
To summarize, my analysis shows that fish prices are the primary driver for increased farming 
rent, whereas increased demand for underlying goods and services is the most important driver 
for rent shifting effects. However, one can also speculate whether high fish commodity prices 
itself provides an opportunity for suppliers to negotiate better deals, and thus capture rent over 
extend periods even if demand were to fall (depending on contract length). Conversely, lower 
fish prices may lead to a lagged reduction in rent shifting effects due to contractual commitment 
negotiated at higher prices.  
Overall, economic theory is well suited to explain the development in both farming rent and 
rent shifting effect. Therefore, one should expect lower rent shifting going forward until new 
positive demand or negative supply shocks occur, considering the vast capacity build-up in 
most segments, whereas the farming rent mostly depends on the fish price and is harder to 
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predict. I now proceed to calculate the aggregate resource rent in the industry by combining the 
results from above in line with eq. (13) and (14). 
6.3 Total Resource Rent – Baseline Results  
Table 12 reports the baseline estimates of the total resource rent in the Norwegian aquaculture 
industry. Column (1) is the realized quantity sold by Norwegian farming firms in the respective 
years. Column (2) is the output from eq. (14) and represents the total resource rent on a per 
kilogram basis. Column (3) shows the total resource rent in the industry. Column (4) and (5) 
splits the results from column (3) into farming rent and rent shifting, respectively. As seen in 
the table, aggregated resource rent in the industry is positive for all years except 2012, i.e., the 
rent shifting effects are not large enough to weigh-off for the negative framing rent.  
Table 12. Resource rent in the Norwegian aquaculture industry – baseline results 
 
  
GWEt 
(000) 
NOK/GWEkg NOK (m) NOK (m) 
NOK 
(m) 
Year Sold fish eq. (14) eq. (15) Farming Shifting 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
2010 883 9.22 8 146 7 632 514 
2011 998 2.49 2 490 1 986 504 
2012 1 161 -0.71 -819 -1 451 632 
2013 1 102 7.1 7 817 7 678 139 
2014 1 179 6.46 7 623 7 336 287 
2015 1 223 5.69 6 952 6 139 813 
2016 1 174 19.72 23 150 21 719 1 431 
2017 1 158 16.9 19 565 19 467 99 
Total 8 879 8.44* 74 925 70 506 4 418 
CAGR (%) 4 9 13 14 -21 
Notes: *weighted average using sold fish as weights. Floating prices. 
My model estimates an accumulated resource rent of NOK 74.92 billion during 2010-2017, 
with a yearly growth rate of 13 percent. Approximately 94 percent ascribes to the farming 
segment, and the remaining 6 percent is rent shifting. The results indicate that measuring 
resource rent in the aquaculture industry based on the farming segments alone suppresses the 
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actual rent, i.e., the costs recorded in the financial statements of the farming firms do not convey 
the real cost of exploiting the resource.  
6.4 Sensitivity Analysis  
In this subchapter, I evaluate the robustness of my baseline estimates by recalculating eq. (9), 
(13), (14), and (15), under two alternative scenarios concerning WACC: low and high. The low 
discount rate scenario applies a fixed WACC of four percent to all segments irrespective of 
different risk profiles. The figure originates from the official guidelines for capital budgeting 
on public investments in Norway (NOU2012:16). Although its relevance for decision making 
in private companies is rather questionable since it fails to account for the firms’ different 
exposure to systematic risk, it is still used in empirical research (Greaker et al., 2017). In the 
high discount rate scenario, I add ten percentage points to the empirically estimated capital 
costs, which on average implies a near doubling (98.2 percent increase) of the WACC. It is 
essential to note that doubling the cost of capital is equivalent to doubling the capital base, 
holding the cost of capital constant. Implicitly, a WACC-based sensitivity analysis is equivalent 
to testing based on IC, all else equal. Table 13 reports the various WACCs used in each scenario.  
Table 13. WACC used in each scenario 
Segment Scenario 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Farming 
High (%) 20.68 20.93 20.06 20.88 20.33 18.55 17.93 18.77 
Base (%) 10.68 10.93 10.06 10.88 10.33 8.55 7.93 8.77 
Low (%) 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
Other* 
High (%) 20.63 20.68 19.77 20.75 20.50 18.59 18.00 18.98 
Base (%) 10.63 10.68 9.77 10.75 10.50 8.59 8.00 8.98 
Low (%) 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
Notes: *Represents a weighted average across all segments using revenue as weights for illustrative purposes. I apply segment-
specific WACCs in the analysis (see appendix 2).    
In line with the baseline analysis, I initiate by evaluating the farming rent estimates, followed 
by rent shifting effects before I conclude with the total resource rent.   
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6.4.1 Farming Rent  
Table 14 reports the farming rent from re-estimating eq. (9) under the additional scenarios. 
Estimating the model subject to the low-specifications returns positive figures for all years, 
including 2012. Conversely, using the high discount rate transforms 2011 to negative. Both 
outcomes portray an underlying uncertainty contained in the input variables, WACC/IC. That 
said, applying the high discount rate inflicts significant stress to the estimates by increasing the 
median WACC/IC by 98.08 percent. The increase materializes in a 53.68 percent drop in the 
rent estimates, i.e., a change in WACC/IC leads, all else equal, to a considerably lower change 
in rents. As a result, one can interpret the results as robust to changes in model parameters, and 
thus provides solid suggestive evidence in favor of substantial rent in the framing segment.     
Table 14. Sensitivity analysis of the resource rent in farming 
Scenario 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Low 10.72 4.09 0.70 9.23 8.63 6.71 19.98 18.83 
Baseline 8.64 1.99 -1.25 6.97 6.22 5.02 18.50 16.81 
High 5.51 -1.04 -4.46 3.67 2.44 1.31 14.72 12.55 
Notes: All numbers are in NOK/GWEkg (floating prices).  
6.4.2 Rent Shifting  
Table 15 shows the rent shifting effects from re-estimating eq. (13) under the additional 
scenarios. As seen in the three last rows of the table, using the high discount rate returns 
negative values in aggregate for all years during 2010-2017. However, there are large 
differences between the various cost groups. Other Operating and Depreciation shows 
considerable robustness and remains positive over the entire period, which illustrates the 
bargaining powers of the segments in the cost group. They manage to profit extensively on the 
ongoing biological issues in the industry and thus captures the most rent of all cost groups. 
Further, the modest margins in the feed group are readily visible from the strongly negative 
value in 2017. An even more strongly negative segment is smolt. I did not comment on smolt 
in the above analysis due to its close integration with farming firms, and issues with intra-firm 
transactions arise. That said, the smolt group also contains the Roe segment, which benefits 
from high barriers to entry from restricted access to vast repositories of genetic material (from 
the 70s and forwards). For this reason, Roe companies still capture rent, but smolt firms weigh 
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substantially more in the cost group value, which yields an overall negative contribution to rent 
shifting.  
Table 15. Sensitivity analysis of the rent shifting effects 
Scenario Cost variable 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Low  
Smolt 0.28 0.35 0.23 0.17 0.28 0.23 0.38 0.17 
Feed 0.75 0.51 0.60 0.30 0.13 0.27 0.53 0.12 
Depreciation 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Other Operating 0.26 0.29 0.27 0.46 0.59 0.73 1.03 0.75 
Process & 
Transportation 
0.02 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.10 
Baseline 
Smolt 0.03 0.08 0.03 -0.07 0.02 -0.01 0.11 -0.19 
Feed 0.42 0.17 0.29 -0.08 -0.27 0.01 0.28 -0.19 
Depreciation 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Other Operating 0.17 0.21 0.19 0.30 0.44 0.58 0.76 0.41 
Process & 
Transportation 
-0.04 0.03 0.03 -0.04 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.05 
High 
Smolt -0.35 -0.26 -0.30 -0.38 -0.35 -0.44 -0.40 -0.83 
Feed -0.05 -0.30 -0.20 -0.58 -0.83 -0.51 -0.30 -0.81 
Depreciation 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Other Operating 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.22 0.27 0.18 -0.21 
Process & 
Transportation 
-0.43 -0.31 -0.40 -0.49 -0.39 -0.25 -0.12 -0.11 
Low  Total 1.31 1.25 1.19 0.94 1.10 1.37 2.05 1.15 
Baseline Total 0.58 0.50 0.54 0.13 0.24 0.67 1.22 0.09 
High Total -0.78 -0.77 -0.83 -1.37 -1.34 -0.93 -0.64 -1.96 
Notes: All numbers are in NOK/kg floating prices.  
6.4.3 Total Resource Rent 
Altogether, the farming rent shows significant strength, and so does some of the cost groups in 
the rent shifting effects. I take the above analysis as strong evidence in favor of both substantial 
farming rent and the existence of shifting effects. For this reason, I stand by my conclusion that 
estimating the resource rent in the aquaculture industry solely based on farming accounts 
suppresses the resource rent, i.e., other parts of the value chain do capture rent, and over the 
study period, particularly the other operating cost group. Figure 24 plots the resource rent from 
eq. (14) with uncertainty (high and low discount rate), and table 16 shows the total rent in the 
Norwegian aquaculture industry.          
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Figure  24. Total resource rent with uncertainty together with the salmon price 
 
Notes: All numbers are in NOK/kg (floating prices). Uncertainty represents the high and low scenarios. 
The low and high discount rate represents the upper and lower bound of the uncertainty field, 
respectively. Whereas the former is fixed at four percent throughout the period, the latter ranges 
between 17 and 28 percent for each segment with an aggregate weighted average of about 20 
percent yearly. A discount rate of 20 percent on a company level is by most standards 
considered a very high rate, even higher than what Wood Mackenzie (2018) finds in the most 
uncertain projects in the petroleum industry, exploration (at about 19 percent before tax). As 
clearly seen in the figure, despite the severe stress form the high discount rate, the rent remains 
positive for all years except 2011 (2012 was already negative at base case). 
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Table 16. Total resource rent in the Norwegian aquaculture industry with uncertainty 
             𝑟𝑟𝑡                                                 𝑅𝑅𝑡   
Year Sold Fish  Low Baseline High Low Baseline High 
  GWEt (000) NOK/GWEkg NOK/GWEkg  NOK/GWEkg NOK (m) NOK (m) NOK (m)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
2010 883 12.03 9.22 4.73 10 631 8 146 4 181 
2011 998 5.34 2.49 -1.81 5 331 2 490 -1 809 
2012 1 161 1.89 -0.71 -5.29 2 197 -819 -6 143 
2013 1 102 10.17 7.1 2.3 11 201 7 817 2 533 
2014 1 179 9.73 6.46 1.1 11 476 7 623 1 294 
2015 1 223 8.08 5.69 0.38 9 879 6 952 469 
2016 1 174 22.03 19.72 14.08 25 867 23 150 16 526 
2017 1 158 19.98 16.9 10.59 23 143 19 565 12 266 
Total  8 879 11.23* 8.44* 3.30* 99 724 74 925 29 318 
CAGR  4 % 8 % 9 % 12 % 12 % 13 % 17 % 
Notes: All numbers are in NOK floating prices 
*weighted average using GWEt as weights. 
Sources: Directorate of Fisheries  
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Column 1 reports the quantity of fish sold by Norwegian farmers in each period in GWE-tonnes. 
Column (2) to (4) displays the results from estimating eq. (14) in each scenario and represents, 
by specification, total resource rent in the industry per GWEkg. Finally, column (5) through (7) 
reports the total resource rent in the industry from eq. (15). The baseline estimate is NOK 74.9 
billion, but applying a low discount rate yields NOK 99.7 billion, which represents an increase 
of 33 percent. The high discount rate, on the other hand, returns an estimate of NOK 29.3 
billion, which equals a 61 percent reduction. However, both scenarios imply significantly larger 
changes in input variables compared to the corresponding rent change, which suggests robust 
results.   
My concluding estimate of the resource rent in the Norwegian aquaculture industry is NOK 
74.9 billion during 2010-2017, with an upper and lower bound of NOK 99.7 and 29.3 billion, 
respectively.  
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7. Conclusion 
In this thesis, I investigate the generation of resource rent in the Norwegian aquaculture industry 
with an emphasis on salmon, trout, and rainbow trout species. Whereas past economic research 
on resource rent assumes that the license holders capture the entire rent, my thesis analyze rent 
by also allowing for rent generation in other parts the value chain, which I term rent shifting. 
By utilizing and extending a basic model for computing economic profits, I develop a 
framework that consists of a farming rent component and a rent shifting component, which on 
aggregate define the total resource rent in the industry. Using firm-specific accounting data on 
more than seven hundred companies from 2010 to 2017, I find that the industry generates 
substantial resource rent. Specifically, the resource rent totals NOK 74.9 billion over the eight 
years with an average farming rent and rent shifting of about NOK 9 and 0.5 billion annually, 
respectively.  
My study indicates that fish prices are the main driver for rent generation in the farming 
segment, whereas increased demand for goods and services is the most important driver for rent 
shifting. The increased demand originates from worsened biological farming conditions that 
force farmers to seek alternative operational measures to comply with strict regulations, e.g., 
mechanical delousing, genetically modified roe, post-smolt, etc. In line with economic theory, 
farming rent seems to persist in the long run due to capacity constraints, whereas new entrants 
and adaptation by existing players mitigate the long-run persistence of rent shifting.  
Considering the continuously rising production costs in the farming segment, one could expect 
an even greater dependency on the fish price going forward. Technical advancements and 
biologically improved production conditions have the potential to increase supply in the long 
run and thus push prices down. However, the industry has a solid track record of extracting 
latent demand in excess of the supply growth, and there is no reason to believe that the full 
market potential is released any time soon. Based on the preceding reasoning, one should expect 
the normalized resource rent to remain positive in the foreseeable future.  
The rent shifting effects have a strong reverting tendency because of forces in the competitive 
markets where the level of profits encourages changed behavior. There are clear signs of 
adaptation to increased demand where supply is rapidly building up in most of the profitable 
segments. For this reason, one should expect the future shifting effects to approach zero. 
However, the industry has yet to solve the existing biological issues that explain the increased 
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demand. Thus, one cannot suppress the chances of new exogenous shocks in the future, e.g., 
new treatment methods, new regulations, etc. that could alter current demand and facilitate 
continuous shifting.  
This thesis contributes to the literature on resource rent by providing a comprehensive bottom-
up analysis of rent generation in the Norwegian aquaculture industry. Further, the study is, to 
the best of my knowledge, the first to empirically quantify rent shifting effects. Moreover, my 
results contribute with new insights into the ongoing debate on whether the industry generates 
rent and should be subject to special taxes by providing empirical evidence of rent. 
Despite robust estimates, this study has at least three limitations. First, the methodology does 
not allow for a meaningful quantification of uncertainty contained in the estimates, such as 
confidence intervals. To obtain probabilities of statistical significance, one must have data on 
firm-level that accounts for ongoing consolidation and restructuring activity. Financial 
statements, as reported by individual entities, fail to adequately account for such activity within 
organizations because one firm may have assets, and another firm may have the associated 
income and costs during the restructuring process.  
Second, my approach does not separate between different kinds of rent. As a result, it is highly 
likely that my empirical results contain quasi rent. Although this has the potential to exaggerate 
resource rent estimate, I still argue that without access to common property, there would not be 
any rent generation at all since the industry cannot operate without quality water and designated 
areas.  
Finally, I do not consider any suboptimal firm or industry structures resulting from the coastal 
population politics of Norway, which possibly undermine the potential value of the resource by 
allowing the least efficient firms to continue its operations, i.e., the authorities may have 
different objectives than maximizing the value of the resources.     
All the above limitations are interesting avenues for further research and could contribute 
greatly to our understanding of how policies affect the value of natural resources.  
To conclude, the Norwegian aquaculture industry generates substantial resource rent from its 
privileged access to high-quality natural resources, and the question of who benefits from the 
common property is more relevant than ever.   
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 Codes for Industrial Classification 
Codes represented in the data set – totaling 108 codes 
1280  25110  42210  52229 
1500  25290  42990  52291 
3111  25620  43210  52292 
3211  25930  43221  58290 
3212  25990  43330  62010 
3213  26510  43990  62090 
3222  26700  45200  68100 
9109  27110  46120  68209 
10201  27900  46389  70220 
10202  28120  46460  71121 
10209  28130  46473  71129 
10411  28221  46510  71200 
10890  28229  46610  72110 
10910  28250  46620  72190 
13929  28290  46630  72200 
13940  28930  46691  73110 
13950  28990  46692  74101 
20110  30111  46693  74909 
20140  30112  46694  77340 
20300  30115  46739  77390 
20590  30120  46740  78200 
21200  33150  46750  80200 
22210  33200  46769  81210 
22220  35113  46900  85320 
22230  38210  50201  85599 
22290  41109  50202  85609 
23140   41200   52222   86906 
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Appendix 2 Segment-based Profitability Analysis 
 
This appendix reports key results from the segment-based profitability analysis on which I 
estimate the resource rent. I report a table with eight variables for each segment in addition to 
a graph to better visualize the historical development of key financial ratios. Further, I also 
report the five largest companies in each segment based on revenues in 2017.   
Tables follow this basic structure: 
Variable Definition 
Number of Companies 
Shows the number of companies in the 
respective fiscal year 
WACC See subchapter 4.3 
ROE (Return on Equity) 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡 =
𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑡
(𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 + 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1)/2
 
ROIC (Return on IC) 𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐶𝑡 =
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑡
(𝐼𝐶𝑡 + 𝐼𝐶𝑡−1)/2
 
Turnover 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡 =
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑡
(𝐼𝐶𝑡 + 𝐼𝐶𝑡−1)/2
 
Operating margin 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡 =
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑡
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑡
 
EBITDA margin  𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡 =
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑡
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑡
 
Credit Rating See subchapter 4.3.2 
 
The appendix is structured as follows: Farming (p.87), Roe (p.88), Smolt (p.89), Wellboats 
(p.90), Service Vessels (p.91), Feed Producers (p.92), Feed Carriers (p.93), Cleaner Fish (p.94), 
Equipment (p.95), Processing (p.96), Packaging (p.97), Fish Health (p.98), NSB-Equipment 
(p.99), Shipyards (p.100), and Other Services (p.101).    
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Farming  
Largest Companies by Revenue 2017 (floating prices) 
 
 
 
 Variable 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Number of 
Companies 
101 92 94 91 88 88 84 82 
WACC (%) 10.68  10.93  10.06  10.88  10.33  8.55  7.93  8.77  
ROE (%) 0.00  21.69  7.18  45.53  35.03  27.00  55.39  43.42  
ROIC (%) 38.33  17.49  6.18  32.01  26.76  22.09  56.88  48.28  
Turnover 1.1823 0.9875 0.8753 1.1897 1.0308 1.1139 1.5556 1.4012 
Operating 
margin (%) 
32.42  17.71  7.07  26.91  25.96  19.84  36.57  34.45  
EBITDA 
margin (%) 
35.65  21.83  11.50  30.44  29.65  23.81  40.00  38.04  
Credit 
Rating 
A+ BBB BB BBB BBB BBB A A 
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Roe 
Largest Companies by Revenue 2017 (floating prices) 
 
 
Variable 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Number of 
Companies 
8 8 9 9 9 10 11 12 
WACC (%) 10.83  10.68  9.89  10.61  10.07  8.61  8.07  8.87  
ROE (%) 24.32 18.79  13.18  16.42  22.81  15.02  28.47  17.12  
ROIC (%) 35.46  39.75  19.86  22.99  28.17  12.01  23.05  13.35  
Turnover 1.1364 1.5617 1.4735 1.4753 1.5168 0.8710 0.9451 0.8251 
Operating 
margin (%) 
31.20  25.45  13.48  15.58  18.57  13.78  24.39  16.18  
EBITDA 
margin (%) 
35.65 29.01  17.51  19.34  21.98  18.98  29.15  21.62  
Credit 
Rating 
A+ A BBB A A- A- A A 
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Smolt 
Largest Companies by Revenue 2017 (floating prices) 
 
 
Variable 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Number of 
Companies 
70 73 73 74 75 77 79 83 
WACC (%)  10.75  12.13  10.11  11.56  11.36  9.73  9.71  9.96  
ROE (%) 12.23  15.10 12.08  10.22  12.03  12.12  14.74  9.52  
ROIC (%) 8.28  11.25  9.90  7.46  9.07  8.62  7.78  4.64  
Turnover 0.6394 0.7014 0.6865 0.6842 0.6796 0.6631 0.6297 0.5326 
Operating 
margin (%) 
12.95  16.04  14.43  10.90  13.35  13.00  12.35  8.72  
EBITDA 
margin (%) 
21.56  25.34  24.69  21.27  23.33  23.48  22.64  19.57  
Credit 
Rating 
BBB BB+ BBB BB+ BB BB BB BB 
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Wellboats 
Largest Companies by Revenue 2017 (floating prices) 
 
 
Variable 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Number of 
Companies  
18 20 21 23 22 25 26 27 
WACC (%) 12.77  12.24  12.01  11.73  10.45  9.16  8.96  10.04  
ROE (%) -1.43  9.10  31.50  23.46  27.82  32.91  32.03  25.08  
ROIC (%) 5.14  8.32  13.90  11.35  14.69  14.26  13.23  11.51  
Turnover 0.4425 0.4793 0.5312 0.4901 0.5119 0.4315 0.3696 0.3880 
Operating 
margin (%) 
11.61  17.36  26.16  23.17  28.71  33.05  35.78  29.67  
EBITDA 
margin (%) 
28.07  34.32  41.60  35.89  39.00  43.82  47.77  42.97  
Credit 
Rating 
B+ BB BB+ BB+ BBB BBB BBB BB+ 
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Service Vessels 
Largest Companies by Revenue 2017 (floating prices) 
 
 
Variable 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Number of 
Companies  
27 32 37 44 51 67 81 86 
WACC (%) 10.75  10.98  11.93  11.71  11.19  9.96  8.95  9.39  
ROE (%) 29.79  25.64  23.79  24.69  35.37  33.08  40.82  24.90  
ROIC (%) 27.38  23.49  18.29  17.47  21.08  16.91  19.02  13.00  
Turnover 1.7442 1.8243 1.4625 1.2307 1.2356 1.1362 1.1032 0.9448 
Operating 
margin (%) 
15.70  12.88  12.51  14.19  17.06  14.88  17.24  13.76  
EBITDA 
margin (%) 
25.15  21.84  22.07  25.07  25.04  23.73  27.13  25.78  
Credit 
Rating 
BBB BBB BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BBB BBB 
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Feed Producers 
Largest Companies by Revenue 2017 (floating prices) 
 
 
Variable 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Number of 
Companies  
6 7 7 8 7 9 9 9 
WACC (%) 10.76  10.94  10.03  11.30  11.38  8.85  7.85  8.84  
ROE (%) 31.59  16.47  24.95  8.23  6.12  8.44  11.07  11.60  
ROIC (%) 22.02  16.05  17.94  9.98  6.27  9.46  15.06  5.66  
Turnover 2.8761 3.1544 2.9798 2.9933 2.9764 3.4696 3.5024 3.3340 
Operating 
margin (%) 
7.66  5.09  6.02  3.33  2.10  2.73  4.30  1.70  
EBITDA 
margin (%) 
9.43  6.69  7.67  4.98  3.94  4.77  6.07  3.62  
Credit 
Rating 
BBB BBB BBB BB+ B+ BB BBB BB 
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Feed Carriers 
Largest Companies by Revenue 2017 (floating prices) 
 
 
 
Variable 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Number of 
Companies  
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
WACC (%) 12.03  12.24  12.56  11.87  11.38  9.96  9.79  10.12  
ROE (%) 10.87  14.26  14.27  17.25  12.89  20.44  15.99  14.39  
ROIC (%) 7.65  7.70  8.02  9.68  6.93  8.42  6.47  7.01  
Turnover 0.6177 0.6187 0.5834 0.5218 0.4831 0.4985 0.4498 0.4020 
Operating 
margin (%) 
12.38  12.45  13.74  18.56  14.34  16.89  14.38  17.43  
EBITDA 
margin (%) 
23.12  23.39  25.91  31.45  26.90  30.43  28.66  31.45  
Credit Rating BB+ BB BB BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ 
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Cleaner Fish 
Largest Companies by Revenue 2017 (floating prices) 
 
 
Variable 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Number of 
Companies 
- - - - 14 22 23 25 
WACC (%) - - - - 17.87  12.10  10.90  9.90  
ROE (%) - - - - 39.80  77.95  26.86  49.26  
ROIC (%) - - - - 6.76  39.01  17.93  32.00  
Turnover - - - - 1.1354 1.3590 0.9092 1.1111 
Operating 
margin (%) 
- - - - 5.96  28.71  19.72  28.80  
EBITDA 
margin (%) 
- - - - 18.36  35.29  28.39  36.15  
Credit Rating - - - - CC CCC B+ BB 
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Equipment 
Largest Companies by Revenue 2017 
 
 
Variable 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Number of 
Companies 
74 76 83 85 85 94 99 103 
WACC (%) 10.80  10.90  10.00  10.83  10.28  8.79 8.44  9.10  
ROE (%) 15.22  17.76 15.42  11.65 18.85  14.75  14.75  9.24  
ROIC (%) 16.48  20.49 18.17  15.08  22.18  18.92 16.92  10.73  
Turnover 2.8026 2.9269 2.4966 2.5572 2.7651 2.6629 2.4580 2.2532 
Operating 
margin (%) 
5.88  7.00  7.28  5.90  8.02  7.11  6.88  4.76  
EBITDA 
margin (%) 
8.15  9.27  9.71  8.17  10.03  9.19  9.06  6.86  
Credit Rating BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB 
 
96 
 
Processing 
Largest Companies by Revenue 2017 (floating prices) 
 
 
Variable 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Number of 
Companies 
43 46 47 48 50 55 56 55 
WACC (%) 14.60  13.42  14.66  15.94  15.31  11.71  11.83  11.07  
ROE (%) 22.81  27.25  17.37  -22.19  11.58  8.04  9.92  6.26  
ROIC (%) 3.02  6.57  4.10  0.57  4.41 5.23  6.19  10.87  
Turnover 1.6708 1.7580 1.4408 1.3866 1.3120 1.9646 5.4122 6.4600 
Operating 
margin (%) 
1.81  3.74  2.85  0.41  3.36  2.66  1.14  1.68  
EBITDA 
margin (%) 
3.40  5.31  4.56  2.37  4.90  4.24 2.50  2.93  
Credit 
Rating 
B B+ B B- B- B- B- B- 
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Packaging 
Largest Companies by Revenue 2017 (floating prices) 
 
 
 
 
Variable 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Number of 
Companies 
6 6 8 8 9 9 9 9 
WACC (%) 10.74  10.60  9.79  10.59  10.05  8.46  7.85  8.82  
ROE (%) 27.21  25.19  19.79  22.08  23.30  25.30  23.36  17.71  
ROIC (%) 51.76  40.52  26.78  25.88  33.09  39.35  32.92  23.46  
Turnover 5.6651 5.4313 4.2953 3.8003 4.6144 5.6463 5.1549 4.6299 
Operating 
margin (%) 
9.14  7.46  6.23  6.81  7.17  6.97  6.39  5.07  
EBITDA 
margin (%) 
11.21  9.67  8.66  9.26  9.47  9.09  8.89  7.22  
Credit 
Rating 
A A A A A A A+ A 
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Fish Health 
Largest Companies by Revenue 2017 (floating prices) 
 
 
 
 
Variable 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Number of 
Companies  
27 30 32 33 35 35 39 39 
WACC (%) 10.78  10.61  9.79  10.58  10.04  8.63  8.39  8.86  
ROE (%) 40.32  45.15  42.89  48.15  56.52  72.20  51.80  36.21  
ROIC (%) 43.51  41.63  38.81  40.24  56.38  63.22  47.82  37.17  
Turnover 4.1108 5.4759 4.9401 4.8249 5.4397 4.8802 3.7930 3.3753 
Operating 
margin (%) 
10.58  7.60  7.86  8.34  10.36  12.95  12.61  11.01  
EBITDA 
margin (%) 
11.90  9.23  9.39  9.89  11.93  14.54  14.46  13.05  
Credit 
Rating 
BBB A- A A A A- A- A 
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Non-sea-based Equipment 
Largest Companies by Revenue 2017 (floating prices) 
 
 
Variable 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Number of 
Companies 
54 57 58 61 64 68 69 71 
WACC (%) 9.35  8.56  7.89  8.44  8.30  7.34  7.22  9.16  
ROE (%) 31.83  46.34 37.28  35.81  41.75  33.07  25.68  17.61  
ROIC (%) 30.61  46.17  38.98  32.98  32.21  29.96  28.82  22.80  
Turnover 4.2427 4.8781 4.6207 4.2906 4.2574 5.2663 4.8620 4.6550 
Operating 
margin (%) 
7.21  9.47  8.44  7.69  7.56  5.69  5.93  4.90  
EBITDA 
margin (%) 
9.41  11.45  10.37  9.54  9.49  7.52  8.01  6.80  
Credit 
Rating 
BBB A- BBB BBB BB+ BBB BBB BB 
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Shipyards 
Largest Companies by Revenue 2017 (floating prices) 
 
 
Variable  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Number of 
Companies  
- - - 18 19 20 21 21 
WACC (%) - - - 11.00  10.34  7.98  6.83  7.24  
ROE (%) - - - 12.78  13.36  20.20 35.40  43.62  
ROIC (%) - - - 31.27  34.30  37.95  48.31  60.91  
Turnover - - - 7.9783 7.6907 7.6542 7.0129 7.1109 
Operating 
margin (%) 
- - - 3.92  4.46  4.96  6.89  8.57  
EBITDA 
margin (%) 
- - - 4.59  5.24  5.53  7.53  9.32  
Credit 
Rating 
- - - BBB BBB BBB BBB A- 
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Other Services 
Largest Companies by Revenue 2017 (floating prices) 
 
 
 
 
Variable 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Number of 
Companies 
20 21 29 30 31 36 40 43 
WACC (%) 10.00  10.30  9.15  10.63  10.20  8.26 7.31  7.88  
ROE (%) 21.69  27.05  20.21  33.65  42.72  43.49  36.12  11.90  
ROIC (%) 26.69  34.19  28.19  44.49  58.30  63.91  41.79  15.54  
Turnover 3.1048 3.1881 3.2618 3.8803 4.8264 4.1537 3.6619 3.0235 
Operating 
margin (%) 
8.60  10.72  8.64  11.47  12.08  15.39  11.41  5.14  
EBITDA 
margin (%) 
13.90  15.84  13.42  15.59  15.97  19.50  16.16  10.65  
Credit 
Rating 
BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB A- A BBB 
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Appendix 3 License Value 
 
I estimate the value of a license by calculating the present value of expected future resource 
rents in perpetuity.    
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
𝑟𝑓𝑡 8.64 1.99 -1.25 6.97 6.22 5.02 18.50 16.81 
Weight 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 
Notes: See chapter 6 Table 6 for the resource rent estimates. I assume a higher weight on the two most recent years from a 
behavioral standpoint. I find it reasonable that recent prosperity has a somewhat more significant impact on present investment 
behavior compared to older years. Additionally, I assume a concave utility function of money.  
Calculate in perpetuity with the following assumptions:  
Weighted average annual resource rent in 
NOK/kg 
9.821 
WACC 10 % 
Economic growth 2 % 
Size of a License in tonnes 780 
Production per license in tonnes* 1,140 
                    Notes: *the average quantity of sold fish per license during 2010-2017 in GWE tonnes (DoF, 2018a). 
The value of a license is then: 
𝑉𝐿 =
9.821 ∗ 1,140 ∗ 1000
0,1 − 0,02
= 139,949,250 
𝑉𝑙 =
139,949,250
780
= 179,422.12 
Where 𝑉𝐿 is the total value of a license in NOK, and 𝑉𝑙 is the value of a license in NOK per 
tonne.   
 
 
